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Clark: Clark: Impact of Nineteenth Century Missouri Courts

The Impact of Nineteenth Century Missouri
Courts upon Emerging Industry: Chambers
of Commerce or Chambers of Justice?
HonorableThomas C. Clark*
It's the economy, stupid!1
I. INTRODUCTION
Although economic
Changes occur, but nothing really changes.
by
recent presidential
society
as
evidenced
dominate
American
considerations
branch of the
to
the
executive
elections, economic considerations are not limited
United States government. Prodigious efforts have been expended by legal
scholars to categorize nineteenth century American judicial systems as glorified
chambers of commerce, which served and subsidized emerging and developing
industries in America. Equally prodigious efforts have been expended by legal
scholars advocating that nineteenth century American judicial systems served as
chambers ofjustice, which adjudicated disputes fairly and consistently within the
legislative will and legal precedent. Against the backdrop of these diverse
perceptions of nineteenth century justice, this Article dissects Missouri Supreme
Court jurisprudence from 1821 to 1870 in an effort to confirm or dissent from
the scholarly opinions expressed above.

* Circuit Court Judge, Jackson County, Missouri, appointed November 12, 1987.
B.A. in Mathematics, B.S. in Engineering Physics with distinction, LL.B., University of
Kansas; Masters in Judicial Studies, University of Nevada-Reno/National Judicial
College. Judge Clark engaged in private practice and served as an assistant city attorney
for Kansas City until his appointment to the bench. Retained in office in 1996, his
current circuit court term expires December 31, 2002.
With gratitude, the Author acknowledges the suggestions, efforts and guidance of
his masters thesis committee members, Chair Elizabeth Francis, Ph.D., University of
Nevada-Reno; Hon. William T. Lohmar, Jr., St. Charles, Missouri; and Hon. Reginald
Stanton, Morristown, New Jersey; the generosity of colleague Hon. John A. Borron in
sharing his "law library;" the patience, enthusiasm and assistance of his co-workers,
Sharon S. Snyder and Diane Woolery; the direction and encouragement of his friend,
Beverly G. Baughman, Esq.; the warm support, contributions and inspiration of his wife,
Margaret; the "urging" of his departed friend, Jorge A. Elliott; the tenacious, steadfast
and proficient counsel by his lawyer, law clerk and friend, Kristen M. Frazier, Esq.; and
the prodigious efforts of Editors Cristian M. Stevens and Daniel P. Devers and the other
members of the MissouriLaw Review. Thank You!
1. See Elizabeth Valk Long, To OurReaders, TIME, Nov. 1, 1993, at 4; American
Pie It's the Economy Stupid, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 12, 1996, at 6.
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In his persuasive and exhaustive work,2 Morton Horwitz devotes significant
time and effort to supporting his theory that the judicial system changed rules
and adopted legal theories to protect the capital wealth of emerging American
industries against "raids" by claimants seeking damages for personal injury or
deprivation of property rights Horwitz directly accuses the state courts of
denying claims against developing industries and, thereby, serving as social
engineers in subsidizing economic development.' Citing isolated cases from
eastern state courts, Professor Horwitz concludes that state courts changed the
rules and established judicial precedents which effectively burdened the weaker
and less fortunate of society with the costs of industrializing nineteenth century
America.5
Gary T. Schwartz challenges Horwitz' thesis. First, Schwartz simplifies
Horwitz' conclusion, claiming that nineteenth century tort law provided a
subsidy to economic enterprise.7 Schwartz then reads and analyzes numerous
tort cases from two geographically different coastal states, New Hampshire,
home of the textile industry in the nineteenth century, and California, allegedly

2. MORTONJ. HoRWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW:
at 67-101 (1977).

1780-1860,

3. Id. at 88, 89. Horwitz writes that, "in a variety of complex and ingenious ways,
courts began to establish rules which substantially limited the liability not only of the
state but of private corporations chartered to undertake works of economic
improvement." Id. at 69.
4. Id. at 99-101. Horwitz contends that because "common law doctrines were
transformed to create immunities from legal liability" and thereby provided "substantial
subsidies for those who undertook schemes of economic development . . . there

developed a pattern of subsidization through the use not of the tax system but of the
legal system." Id. at 99-100.

5. Id. at 99. Horwitz concludes that "subversion of the expanding public law
principle ofjust compensation by the increasingly ruthless application of the private law
negligence principle must be seen as a phenomenon of industrialization.... Indeed,the
law of negligence became a leading means by which the dynamic and growing forces in
American society were able to challenge and eventually overwhelm the weak and
relatively powerless segments of the American economy." Id.
Horwitz confirmed his conclusion, when he stated, "[N]evertheless, it does seem
fairly clear that the tendency of subsidy through legal change during this period was
dramatically to throw the burden of economic development on the weakest and least
active elements in the population. By contrast, it seems plausible to suppose that in a
period when the property tax provided the major share of potential state revenue, the
burdens of subsidy through taxation would have fallen disproportionately on the
wealthier segments of the population." Id. at 101.
6. Gary Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica: A
Reinterpretation,90 Yale L.J. 1717 (1981).
7. Id. at 1718. Schwartz defined the term subsidy, when he stated that "a liability
rule presumably amounts to a subsidy if it entails a departure from an otherwise
appropriate liability standard designed to relieve a class of injurors [sic] from the
expenses of liability." Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/8
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a significant tort haven after its 1849 statehood.8 Schwartz' analysis
persuasively refutes Horwitz' thesis, reestablishing traditional concepts of a fair
justice system. Schwartz concludes that "the nineteenth century negligence
system was applied with impressive sternness to major industries and that tort
law exhibited a keen concern for victim welfare," but with exceptions in
California employer and governmental liability law.9
What better bellwether state by which to measure the opposing theses of
Horwitz and Schwartz than Missouri,' ° a rural, midwestern state, historically
multi-cultural,11 with long-tenured statehood from 1821? Missouri Supreme
Court decisions from as long ago as 1821 are available, and study of this legal
precedent can fairly and adequately adjudge the partiality or impartiality of this
state's judicial system in nineteenth century tort cases. Unlike the Horwitz and
Schwartz articles, which broadly covered nineteenth century tort cases, 12 this
analysis focuses not only on what Missouri's Supreme Court said,but what it
did 3 in tort and related cases directly involving industry litigants from statehood

8. Id. at 1719.
9. Id. at 1717-20. Note that California governmental liability law is not relevant
to this Article. This Article analyzes whether economic considerations unfairly
influenced Missouri state courts to favor emerging industry interests over individual
interests and does not evaluate governmental liability. Employer liability is subsequently
discussed in Part VI which discusses affirmative defenses under the fellow-servant
doctrine.
10. See HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 78. In addition, Missouri is certainly a
permissible jurisdiction to analyze since Horwitz refers to judicial decisions from the
state of Maine, the other half of the Maine-Missouri Compromise. See also FRANCIS A.
WALKER, THE STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, EMBRACING THE

TABLES OF RACE, NATIONALITY, SEX, SELECTED AGES, AND OCCUPATIONS, U.S. DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR 44 (1872) (listing the population of St. Louis as 10,020 in 1820 and
351,189 in 1870 and the population of Missouri as 55,088 in 1820 and 1,603,146 in
1870); CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE

UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 30 (1970) (listing the population of
Missouri as 67,000 in 1820 and 1,721,000 in 1870). The population data apparently
depends upon the resource.
11. For examples of French and Spanish influence within Missouri see generally
Clark v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 203, 224 (1865); Garesche v. Boyce,
8 Mo. 228,232 (1843); Administrators of Wright v. Thomas, 4 Mo. 577 (1835); O'Fallon
v. Daggett, 4 Mo. 343, 349 (1835).
12. Compare HORWrITZ,supranote 2, at 67-101 (Horwitz investigated isolated tort
cases from eastern seaboard states), with Schwartz, supra note 6, at 56-76 (Schwartz
conducted an exhaustive study of New Hampshire and Califomia case law).
13. See, e.g., Boland v. Missouri R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 484, 493 (1865). Compare
what the court said with what it did. The Boland court vigorously said that the standard
for contributory negligence should be commensurate with the capacity of the injured
person in order to be fair to "an infant, an idiot, or a person non compos mentis." Indeed,
it would be harsh to expect "an infant, an idiot, or a person non compos mentis" to abide
by the same negligence standard as "one who had arrived at the age to possess ordinary
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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through 1870.4 In their respective analyses of the legal competition between
emerging industry and individual rights, neither Horwitz nor Schwartz refers to
any judicial decision involving indentured servitude or human bondage, concepts
abhorrent to free enterprise and liberty. Similarly, this analysis directly shuns
judicial decisions involving slavery because those cases are anomalous,
inherently distinguishable, and not instructive. This position was shared by the
Honorable Chief Justice John Marshall, whose opinion is quoted as follows in
Perkinsv. Reeds:15
Can a sound distinction be taken between a human being, in whom another
has an interest, and inanimate property? A slave has volition and has feelings
which cannot be entirely disregarded. These properties cannot be overlooked
in conveying him from place to place. He cannot be stowed away as a
common package. Not only does humanity forbid the proceeding, but it
might endanger his life or health. 6
That distinction between humans and inanimate property underscores the
inapplicability of common carriers' strict liability in slavery cases as further

explained by Chief Justice Marshall:
Being left at liberty, he [the slave] may escape; the carrier has not, and cannot
have, the same absolute control over him that he has over inanimate matter.

judgment and discretion." In Boland,the victim was a two year old child who wandered
onto the tracks and was killed when run over by the defendant's horse car. Despite all
the discussion and attention given to the selection of an appropriate standard of
contributory negligence and the need for jury decision, the trial court and the supreme
court evaded both issues, by deciding that the driver was not negligent and ruling for the
defendant. After all its "preaching" against the harshness of an ordinary negligence
standard for "an infant, an idiot, or a person non compos mentis," the Boland court did
not address the contributory negligence of the victim, precluded jury participation, and
simply ruled for the defendant. Boland was one of only four identified cases decided
exclusively by judicial decree without a trial on the merits or jury assistance.
Interestingly, this decision has been heralded for its dicta on contributory negligence, but
its exclusively judicial decision making has been largely ignored.
14. 1820 to 1870 is representative of the periods surveyed by both Horwitz and
Schwartz. See HoRwrrz, supra note 2, at 67-101; Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1717-56.
Horwitz divided his analysis into three time periods. The first was 1795-1820, in which
the implied contract theory of nonfeasance (common law negligence) changed to a
concept of misfeasance (nineteenth century negligence). The second from 1820-1839,
in which collision cases involving strangers supplemented judicial inquiry into injury
with the added inquiry into carelessness. The third from after 1840, in which the
negligence concepts of collisions are generally applicable. HORNVTZ, supra note 2, at 67101. Schwartz's analysis covers the nineteenth century within New Hampshire and
California. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1717-56.
15. Perkins v. Reeds, 8 Mo. 31 (1843).
16. Id. at 33.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/8
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- In the nature of things, and in his character, he resembles a passenger, and

not a package of goods. It would seem reasonable, therefore, that the
responsibility of the carrier should be measured by the law which is

applicable to passengers, rather than that which is applicable to the carriage
of common goods. 7

Slaves suffering injury and harm during passage on a common carrier
generated atypical litigation because legal protection was afforded the masterowner and not the injured slave. The slave owner's property interest in the slave
was protected for injury or harm to the slave, 8 and, by operation of penal statute,
was also protected for escape. 9 Unauthorized transportation of slaves risked
legal action by owners against transporters, whose culpability ranged from strict
liability to willful intent.20 The ultimate irony of these cases culminated in
Calvert v. Steamboat Timoleon.2 1 Steamboat Timoleon defended against the
master's suit asserting a legal fiction, that the "slave" in question, although still
in bondage, was legally an emancipated free person. Poetic justice prevailed.
The court held that emancipation was exclusively a personal right, which, if
disputed, was unavailable to third parties or steamboats as a defense.22 The
railroad industry encountered similar consequences for unauthorized
transportation of slaves,' and these cases are equally inapplicable because
humans are not property.
II. STEAMBOATS AND NAVIGATION

A. PrivateShoreline UsageLimited to Emergencies
Nature's Creator endowed the State of Missouri with the foremost and least
expensive canal system in the land, bequesting the Mississippi and Missouri
Rivers. Navigation and fishing interests claimed the benefits and clashed with
17. Id.
18. See Johnson v. Steamboat Arabia, 24 Mo. 86 (1856). In Johnson, a young

enslaved male, required to work for an officer of the ship while being transported from
Kentucky to St. Louis,

fell overboard and drowned.

Judgment for the plaintiff

slaveowner was affirmed against the steamboat Arabia for wrongfully forcing the
enslaved male to work on the boat which led to his death. Id. at 87.
19. See Withers v. Steamboat El Paso, 24 Mo. 204, 210 (1857). The court said that
the penal statute, "was intended to be, a substantial protection to the slave property of our
citizens residing in the vicinity of our large rivers."
20. See id.; but see also Russell v. Taylor, 4 Mo. 550 (1835) (holding that the trial
court's instructions were too broad and reversing a verdict directed for the defendant,
remanding the case for a new trial), and Lee v. Sparr, 14 Mo. 371 (1851) (the court
upheld a directed verdict in favor of the defendant steamboat).
21. Calvert v. Steamboat Timoleon, 15 Mo. 595 (1852).
22. Id. at 595-97.
23. See, e.g., Rogers v. Pacific Railroad, 35 Mo. 153 (1864).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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private shoreline interests. Establishing precedent regarding the inevitable
competition between individual and industry interests, the Missouri Supreme
Court endorsed the long-tenured maxim, "[E]very one should so use his rights
as not to injure or molest others in the enjoyment of theirs. 24
In O'Fallon v. Daggett, plaintiff sued in trespass quare clausum fregit
seeking damages for injury inflicted by defendants' establishment of repair
facilities and attendant land usage along plaintiff's Mississippi River shoreline
for an extended six-week period. Plaintiff claimed title of ownership and the
right to damages, while defendants insisted that the Mississippi River was a
public highway and a common navigable stream providing shoreline upon which
boats landed and "lade and unlade" their vessels of cargo and passengers "at
their like, free will and pleasure." ' The trial court, sitting as a jury, adopted
defendants' legal position and entered judgment for defendants.26 Upon appeal,
however, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized and respected plaintiff's
ownership, noting that the "Spanish Government granted the land to the water's
'
edge."27
Furthermore, balancing competing interests and acknowledging the
existence of nautical emergencies necessitating landings, the court conceded
defendants' right to repair, but said that "the right to repair must, therefore, '2be
limited to cases of emergency, and not extended to cases ofmere convenience.
Establishing what would become long-standing precedent and policy, the court
rejected unrestricted navigation industry usage of private shoreline to the
exclusion of private ownership rights, holding as follows:
It seems to us, this qualification of the privilege to occupy the bank, when the
property is in a private person, is reasonable; the general interests of
navigation have been anxiously guarded by most commercial nations, and so
they are with us, but it does not follow that the private rights of the people
who own the land are, for that reason, to be disregarded. When a vessel is on
a voyage and meets with any accident, which makes it necessary to touch the
bank, she has a right to do so, leaving the bank, when private, as soon as
practicable.29
This pronouncement was not challenged in subsequent navigation litigation,
despite the fact that Missouri courts' jurisdiction over the Mississippi River was
not judicially confirmed until 1850.30

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

O'Fallon v. Daggett, 4 Mo. 343 (1835).
Id. at 343.
Id.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 349.
O'Fallon,4 Mo. at 348.
Swearingen v. Steamboat Lynx, 13 Mo. 519 (1850).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/8
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B. Liabilityfor Entrustmentof Property
Legal distinctions attach to the method by which property is entrusted to
another and generally these distinctions determine the legal principles and rules
by which disputes are adjudicated by the Missouri courts.3' While significant
legal consequences naturally flow from plaintiff's chosen theory of recovery,32
contractual duties incurred and liability imposed profoundly differ between
bailments for hire by common carriers and generic bailments, and so might the
results.33 To evaluate judicial treatment of navigation interests for losses or
damages to property requires full knowledge of the facts, the dispute and the
disposition, regardless of any "artificial" legal designations. The following two
Sections of this Article demonstrate that the Missouri Supreme Court adhered to
established legal principles, avoided technical dispositions by trial judges,
favored jury resolution of disputes, and impartially applied the consequences.
These two Sections also distinguish between common carriers for hire and
parties performing simple bailments.
a Common carriers for hire are insurers of their bailed cargo, save acts of God
and public enemies.34 Although proof of negligence or inattention supports
recovery against a common carrier for hire, recovery also can be predicated upon
proof of damage to, or loss of, entrusted goods. By contrast, in simple bailments
the bailee must exercise ordinary care in controlling or managing another's
property and is only liable for ordinary negligence or inattention. 35

31. See Smithers v. Steamboat War Eagle, 29 Mo. 312, 315 (1860) (distinguishing
common carrier liability); see also Perkins v. Reeds, 8 Mo. 33, 35 (1843) (citing Boyce
v. Anderson, 2 Peters 150, 154-55 (1829), in which Chief Justice Marshall proclaims the
inapplicability of general principles governing the law of bailment, normally used by
courts in cases of lost property, specifically the doctrine of common carriers, when the
case involves lost human property) (emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., Smithers, 29 Mo. at 312 (1860). Defendant's appeal was predicated
upon plaintiff's failure to specifically assert defendant's status which was central to
plaintiff's common carrier theory of recovery; yet the court upheld plaintiff, saying the
petition was adequate in this regard. Id. at 315.
33. See id.
34. Wolf v. American Express Co., 43 Mo. 421, 425 (1869). Emphatically, the
supreme court recites that the common carrier is "not only responsible for any loss or
injury to the goods he carries which is caused by his negligence, but the law raises an
absolute and conclusive presumption of negligence whenever the loss occurs from any
other cause than 'the act of God or the public enemy."' Id. The court further clarified
the "Act of God" exception, stating that:
The act of God which excuses the carrier must not only be the proximate
cause of the loss, but the better opinion is that it must be the sole cause. And
where the loss is caused by the act of God, if the negligence of the carrier
mingles with it as an active and co-operative cause he is still responsible.
Id.
35. Smithers, 29 Mo. at 315.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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1. Bailments for Hire (Common Carriers)
"Intimidating" best describes the common carrier for hire's "stringent
responsibility."36 After claimant has proven common carrier-for-hire status and
damage to the goods, the common carrier shoulders the burden of proving
causation by an act or peril which is legally recognized as an exemption. 7 Still,
the common carrier incurs liability if the "injury might have been avoided by the
exercise of reasonable skill and attention on the part of the persons employed in
the conveyance of the goods."38 The common carrier is always responsible for
any "loss occasioned by his negligence and inattention to duty."39
Best illustrating claimants' advantage in proceeding against, and seeking
recovery from, a common carrier on the bailment-for-hire theory is Smithers v.
Steamboat War Eagle. Plaintiff's horse was transported from St. Louis to
Lexington, Missouri, aboard the steamboat War Eagle. While unloading, the
horse fell off the staging and was killed.4° Plaintiffs petition alleged that
defendant's officers and crew were careless, unskillful, misdirected and
negligent, but failed to allege that the defendant was a common carrier. Still,
plaintiff submitted his case to the jury on the theory of common carrier liability
and received the jury verdict. On appeal, defendant insisted that plaintiffs
recovery depended upon proof of defendant's negligence, together with
appropriate instructions, citing Ready v. Steamboat Highland Mary.4 The
supreme court affirmed plaintiffs judgment, construed plaintiffs petition to
sufficiently plead common carrier status, and disregarded plaintiff's negligence
allegations as "surplusage." 42
For inexplicable reasons, in Pomeroy v. Donaldson, at plaintiffs request,
the court instructed the jury on both common carrier liability 43 and on

36. Wolf, 43 Mo. at 425.
37. Id. at 426; see also Sawyer v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 37 Mo. 152,
164 (Common carriers "are not responsible where all reasonable care, skill and diligence,
prudence and foresight have been employed. They are not liable for mere accident or
misadventure, any more than for the act of God, or the public enemy, for any sudden
convulsion of nature, or an unknown or unforseen destruction, or an unknowable
insufficiency....").
38. Wolf,43 Mo. at 426.
39. Id.
40. Smithers, 29 Mo. at 313.
41. 17 Mo. 461 (1853). Plaintiff lost his horse during a steamboat voyage. The
court considered but did not determine whether freight charges of $5 had been paid for
the passage of the horse, or the resultant status of the steamboat. Thus, the decision did
not rest upon the steamboat's common carrier-for-hire status, but rather upon the ordinary
negligence of a simple bailee. Id.
42. Smithers, 29 Mo. at 313.
43. 5 Mo. 36 (1837) ("[A] ferryman was bound to use the strictest diligence, and
like a common carrier, was liable for all accidents, except such as were the act of God,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/8
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defendant's negligence." At defendant's request, the court also instructed the
jury that plaintiff could not recover if he or his agent negligently drove the horse
and wagon onto the boat. 5 The supreme court affirmed plaintiffs jury verdict,
noting that the jury was well instructed regarding the liability of the defendant
ferryman and the consequences of plaintiffs negligence. The supreme court
surmised that the jury seemingly found that defendant negligently caused the
accident.4
The Missouri Supreme Court has consistently thrust upon common carriers
the duty "to transport goods to a particular destination [which] necessarily
includes the duty to deliver them in safety... in proper time and manner, and at
a proper place, andprimafacie to the consignee personally,"47 as was required
in Bartlett v. Steamboat Philadelphia. Despite plaintiff's absence when the
steamboat Philadelphialanded and discharged its cargo, leaving plaintiff s cargo
of "gunnies" on the dock, plaintiffs jury verdict still was affirmed. In the
absence of any custom or usage, common carriers were further obligated to store
the freight or return it if plaintiff or an agent failed to appear.4"
Consignee's acceptance of goods delivered to a different site than
specified in the contract did not extinguish plaintiff's breach of contract claims
against the common carrier, unless expressly waived.49 The supreme court
preserved plaintiff Atkisson's breach of contract claim, but gave other reasons
for reversing plaintiff s judgment after a jury verdict. Offsetting that reversal,
the supreme court affirmed recovery based on negligent towing by the steamboat
Diurnalin Miles v. Steamboat Diurnal,50 again deferring to the jury decision.
Uncertainty reigns when the common carrier returns the freight, but is denied its
freight charges because the value of the freight is comparable, making it

or the enemies of the State.").
44. Id. ("[T]he defendant was answerable for the acts and negligence of his agents
employed at the ferry in taking passengers across.").
45. Id.
46. Id. at 39.
47. See Bartlett v. Steamboat Philadelphia, 32 Mo. 256, 259 (1862); see also
Erskine v. Steamboat Thames, 6 Mo. 371, 373 (1840).
48. Bartlett,32 Mo. at 259.
49. Atkisson v. Steamboat Castle Garden, 28 Mo. 124, 128 (1859). Goods
consisting of lumber and whisky were delivered to and accepted by plaintiff at a point
short of the destination. The jury verdict for plaintiffs was reversed due to incorrect
evidentiary rulings, and an incorrect measure of damages which should have been the
value of the goods at the point of destination less freight charges and costs of
transportation.
50. 34 Mo. 588 (1864). Miles contracted with the defendant to tow its "bowdock," [a small floating dock used to raise the bows of steamboats so as to permit certain
repairs to be made] but in passage, the bow-dock sank and was lost. The supreme court

upheld the plaintiff's jury verdict and approved the instructions which allowed recovery
based upon defendants' negligence rather than common carrier status. Id. at 590-91.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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economically unfeasible to return the goods." Acknowledging that the "uniform
usage" or "custom" was to return any rejected freight, the supreme court held
that practice unreasonable if the goods were of a "perishable nature" or the
"freight (return charge) constitutes a large proportion of their value" at the
destination.52 The carrier's acts were accordingly governed by the circumstances
of the case.
Judicial retreat from imposing further strict duties upon common carriers
based upon a clause in the bill of lading occurred in Sturgess v. Steamboat
Columbus. 3 Sweet potatoes being transported from Natchez to St. Louis rotted
during an eleven-day delay at Cairo due to low channel. The bill of lading
provided "the privilege of reshipping in case of low water."'54 The trial judge
heard the evidence and entered judgment for plaintiff, holding that the common
carrier was obligated to "reship" when delayed by low water; however, the
supreme court reversed and remanded the case, designating the reshipping
provision as a privilege to the carrier and not obligatory. 5 Perhaps without
design, but nonetheless enforcing an image of fairness, the Missouri Supreme
Court affinmed another trial judge's award of $50 for damages to a piano on a
"contract of affreightment."56
Technical rulings by trial judges favoring defendant steamboats met
supreme court resistance. In Erskine v. Steamboat Thames57 and Camden v.
Steamboat Georgia,5" plaintiffs sued common carriers for failure to deliver
goods. In Erskine, the trial court entered judgment for defendant because
plaintiffs' petition failed to allege that plaintiffs made demand for the goods. In
Camden, the trial court sustained defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's general
allegations, describing the bailed property as "divers other goods and
merchandise" and entering judgment for defendant.5 9 In both cases, the supreme
court reversed and remanded, concluding that the Erskine petition was properly
framed and directing the trial court to allow Camden to amend its petition. Such
leniency ceased in Syme v. SteamboatIndiana.6' In remanding this case to the

51. See Steamboat Keystone v. Moies, 28 Mo. 243 (1859). Steamboat Keystone
hauled iron castings from St. Louis to Eldridge Brothers Company at Wyandott, Kansas
Territory, encountered rejection and returned the castings to St. Louis. Jurors more than
doubled the one-way freight charges of $72, rendering a $150 verdict to Steamboat
Keystone which was reversed and remanded by the supreme court. Id. at 243-44, 247.
52. Id. at 245.
53. 23 Mo. 230, 232 (1856).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Leith v. Steamboat Pride, 16 Mo. 181 (1852).
57. 6 Mo. 371, 371-72 (1840).
58. Id. at 381, 388.
59. Id. at 383.
60. 28 Mo. 335,.337 (1859). Plaintiff's goods being shipped by defendant from
New Orleans to St. Louis were never delivered. Plaintiff's petition failed to allege that
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/8
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61 .

trial court, the supreme court set aside the jury verdict, and held that the petition
was scarcely distinguishable from an "ordinary gratuitous bailment"'" petition
and therefore was deficient.
In summary, of the ten foregoing common carrier-for-hire cases against the
steamboat industry, all six jury trials resulted in plaintiffs' verdicts, four of which
were affirmed 62 and two of which were reversed and remanded63 by the supreme
court. Four cases were adjudicated by trial judges, two favoring the defendants'
and two favoring the plaintiffs,65 three of which were reversed and remanded by
the supreme court. Steamboat Keystone, as plaintiff, received a jury verdict in
its suit to collect freight charges, but suffered reversal on appeal. An overall
analysis suggests impartial and even-handed judicial treatment of navigation
interests, but certainly not favoritism.'
2. Gratuitous Bailments
In Ready v. Steamboat HighlandMary,6 7plaintiff sued for the negligent loss
of his horse while traveling from Rocheport, Missouri, to the Kansas Territory
on the steamboat HighlandMary. The trial court entered judgment for plaintiff
for $125 because defendant's boat had attempted a nighttime passage through
a known difficult and dangerous course on the Missouri River near the mouth of

defendant was a common carrier, that the goods were ever received, that defendant
converted the goods, or that any consideration was paid for the shipment. At trial,
defendant objected to presentation of evidence respecting those missing allegations, but
was overruled, and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. Id. at 337.
61. Id. at 337.
62. Miles v. Steamboat Diurnal, 34 Mo. 588, 588 (1864); Bartlett v. Steamboat
Philadelphia, 32 Mo. 256, 259 (1862); Smithers v. Steamboat War Eagle, 29 Mo. 312,
313 (1860); Pomeroy v. Donaldson, 5 Mo. 36,37 (1837).
63. Atkisson v. Steamboat Castle Garden, 28 Mo. 124 (1859); Syme, 28 Mo. at
335.
64. Camden v. Steamboat Georgia, 6 Mo. 381, 381 (1840); Erskine v. Steamboat
Thames, 6 M6. 371, 371 (1840).
65. Sturgess v. Steamboat Columbus, 23 Mo. At 230 (1856); Leith v. Steamboat
Pride of the West, 16 Mo. 181 (1852).
66. SeeAtkisson, 28 Mo. at 129; Steamboat Keystone v. Moies, 28 Mo. 243, 249
(1859); Syme, 28 Mo. at 337; Camden, 6 Mo. at 381; Erskine, 6 Mo. at 37. See also
Railey v. Porter, 32 Mo. 471 (1862). Of interest in Railey is the fact that although a
common carrier for hire, steamboat A.C. Goddin was liable to plaintiffs for misdelivery
of hemp seed to T.B. Wallace instead of C.O. Wallace at Lexington. Defendants,
"forwarding and commission merchants," were not exonerated from responsibility and
remained liable to plaintiffs for ordinary negligence for their failure to give notice of the
shipment to the consignee. Id. at 474. This illustrates stem judicial treatment being
uniformly administered, and not just sternly administered towards the navigation
industry.
67. 17 Mo. 461 (1853).
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the Little Blue River. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
remanded the case, holding that all circumstances surrounding the passage over
dangerous and difficult courses in the river must be considered in determining
any negligence by the boat operators and adding that negligence could not be
inferred from night passage alone. 8 Upon remand, a jury verdict for Ready
ratified the earlier judgment. With reluctance, the supreme court remanded
Ready II because potentially harmful hearsay testimony. was admitted. 9
Notably, however, the Missouri Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial
court for final disposition.7"
Ready also is significant for what was not done. The amended petition in
Ready alleged that the horse had been carried for hire, while the answer denied
any such contract between the parties. No factual determination was made. The
obligation of a carrier for hire is very different from that of a carrier without
reward, but both courts declined to address bailment for hire.7' The supreme
court ignored facts and legal theory pertaining to bailment for hire and confined
its review to the negligence of the gratuitous bailee.72
In contrast to the steamboats' common carrier liability as bailees for hire of
cargo, which was pervasive and readily enforced, the Missouri Supreme Court
firmly and consistently protected riverboat owners from that same common
carrier liability for losses resulting from gratuitous bailments of money (i.e.,
"specie") to crew members.73 In Whitmore v. Steamboat Caroline,the court
upheld the trial court's directed verdict for the steamboat Caroline,stating that
imposition of liability upon boat owners for unplanned, gratuitous and secret
undertakings of crew members to deliver money in kind would render a "great
injustice" because there was no "reciprocity" or benefit to the owners
commensurate with the risk.74 In Whitmore, plaintiff transferred $1,500 in gold
to the clerk of the steamboat Carolinefor safekeeping during passage up the

68. Id.
69. Ready v. Steamboat Highland Mary, 20 Mo. 264 (1855). Upon retrial before
a jury, plaintiff prevailed, winning a judgment for $125. However, the judgment was
again reversed because of the erroneous admission of hearsay statements made by the
boat's pilot. The pilot had stated that he did not intend to pass by the mouth of the Little
Blue that night. The court responded:
Upon this ground, then, we would not disturb the judgment; but this court is,
with reluctance, compelled to send the case back, for the act of the court
below, in admitting that part of Sublett's deposition, in which he details a
conversation between himself and Mr. Holland, a pilot on the boat.
Id. at 265.
70. Id.
71. Ready, 17 Mo. 463.
72. Id.
73. Chouteau v. Steamboat St. Anthony, 20 Mo. 519 (1855); Whitmore v.

Steamboat Caroline, 20 Mo. 513 (1855).
74. Whitmore, 20 Mo. at 518.
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Illinois River. The gold was to be tendered in payment for the purchase of wheat
at the end of the trip. During passage, the gold was reported stolen; plaintiff
sued and the trial court directed a verdict for defendant because plaintiff failed
to prove a known usage or custom that steamboats carried money for hire.
Whitmore simply followed the supreme court's holding in "Chapter 1I" of
the four-chapter saga of Chouteau v. SteamboatSt. Anthony.7 5 The court opined
that steamboat owners' liability as common carriers for the loss of money
entrusted by passengers to the ship's clerk depended upon strict proof of a
known usage, that the steamboat carried money for hire on account of the owner,
or that such was a known usage within the steamboat trade.76 "Freight or money
must be proportioned to the risk assumed. No owner of a boat would permit her
to carry money without a reward compensating for the risk, if he was aware that
he would be liable in the event of its loss."77
Thus distinguishing steamboats' common carrier liability as bailees for hire
from the more lenient gratuitous bailee standard requiring simple proof of
negligence, the supreme court in "Chapter IV" ofthe Chouteauv. SteamboatSt.
Anthony saga conclusively terminated steamboat liability for gratuitous
bailments. The supreme court commented that "a steamboat is not a person who
can undertake a gratuitous bailment., 78 Still, this halo ofjudicial immunity from
liability for gratuitous bailments of money granted steamboats a safe haven, but
not an absolute sanctuary from liability as a common carrier of money. Only if
plaintiffs achieved very formidable proof requirements, proving either that the
steamboats' standard usage was to carry money for hire on account of the
owners or that such was a known usage within the steamboat industry, would the
steamboats be held liable.
Ultimately, Chouteau tested both the patience and judicial skills of the
supreme court, as evidenced by the following comment: "[T]his is the third or
fourth time this cause has been in this court, and it would be some consolation
to know when there will be an end of it." 79 Nevertheless the supreme court did
not finalize the disposition as it did in Whitmore, but remanded the case to the
trial court for further proceedings as it had done in Ready.
In objectively assessing the judicial treatment afforded to individual
plaintiffs versus the steamboats in these bailment cases, it is apparent that
impartial application of legal principles predominated even though defendants
generally prevailed. Ready was "reluctantly" remanded for disposition by a trial
court or jury, both of which had already returned verdicts for plaintiff. Lower
court dispositions in Chouteau were reversed four times for comprehensive

75.
(1855).
76.
77.
78.
79.

11 Mo. 226 (1847); 12 Mo. 389 (1849); 16 Mo. 216 (1852); 20 Mo. 519
Chouteau, 16 Mo. at 222-25; see also Whitmore, 20 Mo. at 518.
Whitmore, 20 Mo. at 513, 517.
Chouteau, 20 Mo. at 521.
Id.
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reasons, twice for each party. Admittedly, Professor Horwitz could selectively
point to Whitmore to support his thesis that state courts protected the steamboat
industry in Missouri, but to do so ignores that Whitmore was only one of four
identified cases that was exclusively decided by judicial decree (without a trial
on the merits or jury decision). However, the Missouri Supreme Court's
reluctance to hold owners responsible for unauthorized and "dubious" gratuitous
bailments of money to employees was fairly balanced by formidable proof
requirements allowing recovery from steamboat owners who countenanced
gratuitous bailments of money to employees as their "standard usage" or as a
"known usage."
C. Collision Cases
Professor Horwitz credits the steamboat collision cases for releasing
English jurisprudence from the shackles of common law actions of trespass and
trespass on the case. Classifying actors within such cases as either active or
passive, he advocates that such cases forced the courts to start looking at
circumstances surrounding carelessness. Judicial analysis of the steamboat cases
also distinguishes victims as "strangers" to whom neither contract nor implied
contract was applicable." Horwitz contends that these changes provided the
means by which state courts favored emerging industry.
Appraisal of judicial treatment of steamboats as an emerging industry
requires an examination of steamboat litigation in Missouri, especially the
collision cases. Steamboat collision cases best portray the transition from
judicial usage of the common law forms of action, with concepts of strict
liability, to more contemporary concepts of liability based upon negligent
conduct. Close investigation reveals consistent and uniform application of
principles of law by the Missouri Supreme Court to all litigants without
exception and without any ploy or design to attain a judicially preferred
disposition.
1. Steamboat Collisions with Others
The first important steamboat collision decision in Missouri abided by the
entrenched maxim, "[Y]ou shall so use your own as not to hurt your neighbor's
property., 82 In Steamboat United States v. Mayor of St. Louis, 83 the court
adopted a strict liability approach by imposing liability on the steamboat United
States which, while trying to dock, struck and sank the keelboat Tom Roberts.
The Tom Roberts was moored and "well secured" at the dock. Nevertheless, the

80. HORWITZ, supranote 2, at 88, 89.
81. HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 88, 89.
82. Steamboat United States v. Mayor of St. Louis, 5 Mo. 230, 233 (1838).

83. Id.
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65.

court imposed liability without considering fault by the steamboat UnitedStates,
holding steamboats to the "strictest and most scrupulous care in navigating our
rivers.
Thereafter, in two similar boating collision cases, the court assessed each
party's exercise of ordinary care and any contributory negligence, rather than
imposing strict liability. 5 In Chouteau v. Uhrig,the trial court instructed the
jury to determine "if the loss of the keel-boat was occasioned by the omission of
86
ordinarycareon the part of the officers or hands employed on the steamboat.
Defendants' evidence showed that appellant Chouteau's crew exercised every
precaution to avoid collision while trying to land after dark during a storm.
Despite defendants' evidence, the jury reached a verdict for plaintiffs for $450,
which was affirmed.87 Likewise, in Steamboat Western Belle v. Wagner,88 the
defendant steamboat collided with and sank plaintiffs' flatboat loaded with
wheat and whiskey. The flatboat was docked when the steamboat tried to land
to acquire wood, albeit after dark and during a storm. Recognizing contributory
negligence as the issue, the trial court instructed that the verdict must be for the
defendant steamboat if any fault or negligence on the part of the operators of the
flatboat caused the accident or injury.8 9 The jury rendered a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff flatboat owners. The supreme court reversed and remanded the case
for retrial, finding error in the verdict-directing instruction. Nevertheless,
contributory negligence became a determinative issue in navigation mishaps.
To circumvent the unfair and harsh consequences of contributory
negligence, the supreme court distinguished passive or remote negligence from
negligence which proximately caused the injury.9" In Adams v. Wiggins Ferry
Co.,91 defendant's vessel collided with and sank an improperly moored barge.
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed judgment for the plaintiff, as his
negligence was merely passive, and noted, "[B]ecause one has committed a fault

84. Id.
85. Steamboat Western Belle v. Wagner, 11 Mo. 30, 32 (1847); Chouteau v. Uhrig,
10 Mo. 62, 66 (1846).
86. Uhrig, 10 Mo. at 64.
87. Id.
88. Western Belle, 11 Mo. at 30, 32.
89. Id. at 31.
90. See Adams v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 27 Mo. 95, 101 (1858). The Adams court
noted:
We conceive the law.., to be, that, although where both parties are in fault,
where there is negligence on both sides, and both actively contribute to the
injury at the time of its commission, there can be no recovery, yet, where
there is a mere passive fault or negligence on the part of the plaintiff, the
defendant is bound to observance of ordinary care and prudence in order to
avoid doing him a wrong.
Id. at 101.
91. Id.
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or been guilty of a negligence, he does not thereby place himself at the mercy of
every one who may encounter or come in the way of the object .... 92
The supreme court continued to avoid any unfairness imposed by strictly
technical decisions. In Cable v. St. Louis Marine Railway & Dock Co.,93
technicalities regarding the real party in interest did not negate plaintiffs verdict
arising from a Mississippi River boat accident. The Missouri Supreme Court
followed precedent established in the wrongful death case of James v. Christy94
decided just two years earlier.
2. Steamboat Collisions with Steamboats
Similarly, collision litigation between steamboats conformed to the same
legal principles of negligence and contributory negligence. Distinctions between
active and passive negligence were determinative and provided the proper
standard of conduct. In Atchison v. Steamboat Dr. Franklin,95 involving a
Mississippi River collision between the steamboat Amarath and the steamboat
Dr.Franklin,plaintiffs judgment was affirmed. The supreme court emphasized
that the jury had been properly instructed, specifically noting the contributory
negligence instruction.
Another plaintiff's verdict, in 1854, withstood defendants' contentions of
instructional error generated by the conflict between adopted navigational rules
and custom or usage. 96 The supreme court concluded in Rogers v. McCune that
taking "all the instructions together, as forming the law of the case,"'97 the jury
98
was correctly instructed on negligence and contributory negligence.
Furthermore, the court explained that the law determines what constitutes
"proper precautionary measure[s] . . . to avoid collisions"-a judicial

decision-while the jury determines whether such acts are performed.9"
In Galena,Dunleith & Minnesota Packet Co. v. Vandergrift, defendants'
jury verdict and judgment were affirmed despite "voluminous instructions"

92. Id. at 98. ("One person being in fault will not dispense with another's using
ordinary care for himself.").
93. 21 Mo. 133 (1855).
94. 18 Mo. 162 (1853).
95. 14 Mo.63, 71 (1851).
96. See Rogers v. McCune, 19 Mo. 557 (1854). Steamboat Die Vernon, while
descending the Mississippi River, struck and sank the steamboat Archer, drowning 35
people. Rules of the Upper Mississippi River Pilots' Association and general custom
regarding steamboat travel were admitted into evidence and considered by the jury, but
the court commented that the weight of the testimony, if credited by the jury, was
sufficient to show that the custom was not dispositive in the case. Id. at 567.
97. Id. at 569.
98. Id. at 562, 568.
99. Id. at 568.
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which may have confused the jury.' ° The court held that, overall, the
instructions properly directed the jury to the duties of the parties."'1
Hence, the foregoing cases demonstrate that, despite the supreme court
withholding complete endorsement of each given instruction, judicial emphasis
was placed upon the cumulative effect of the overall package of instructions in
supporting the jury decision. Three steamboat collision cases had no impact on
this Article. When the steamboat Shelby collided with the steamboat John
Quincy Adams, plaintiffwon the jury verdict andjudgment, but suffered reversal
by the supreme court on an evidentiary ruling. 0 2 Yore v. Steamboat C. Bealer 0 3
established Missouri jurisdiction over boat collisions in Missouri waters
regardless of the owners' citizenship. Likewise, Missouri jurisdiction over
boating collisions in Missouri waters, specifically including the Mississippi
River, was established in Swearingen v. Steamboat Lynx.'04
D. Wrongful Death
Predictably, the Missouri Supreme Court's uncompromising judicial
impartiality applied unabated to both steamboats and individuals, including
passengers who sustained injuries and/or death. In James v. Christy, an
explosion on board, caused by the negligence of the steamboat's crew, resulted
in the death of a fifteen-year-old passenger."0 The decedent's father sued for
the wrongful death of his son, but while litigation was ongoing, the father
himself suffered an early and untimely death. His administrator was substituted
as plaintiff. On motion, the suit was abated by the trial court. 1 6 The Missouri
Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the suit did not abate by the

100. 34 Mo. 55, 63 (1863).
101. Id. at 63. Plaintiff's Royal Arch was ascending the Mississippi River when
it collided with defendants' Empire City sinking the RoyalArch. Over-emphasis on the
duty of the RoyalArch crew to stop and back up when the collision became probable, by

itself, constituted instructional error, but that error was cured by the other instructions.
Id.
102. Patrick v. Steamboat J.Q. Adams, 19 Mo. 73, 77 (1853).
103. Yore v. Steamboat C. Bealer, 26 Mo. 426, 429 (1858).

104. 13 Mo. 519, 521 (1850). Steamboats Lynx and Ohio collided in the
Mississippi River, trial resulted in a defendants' verdict based upon the circuit court
judge's instruction restricting recovery to the territorial limits of Missouri. Id. at 519.
The supreme court held that Missouri law applied to collisions on Missouri's waterways
including the Mississippi River, concluding that otherwise a neutral territory would exist
along Missouri's borders "where contracts could not be enforced and wrongs must go
unredressed." Id. at 521.
105. 18 Mo. 162 (1853).

106. Id. at 164.
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father's
death; his administrator was the proper party in interest to continue the
107
case.

The father, as plaintiff, claimed damages for both the value of his son's
services plus the society or comforts afforded by a child to his parents.
Thereafter, the father died, extinguishing any claim for loss of society and
comfort with his son. The father's estate, as successor plaintiff, was confined to
a singular claim-the actual value of the son's services during the father's
lifetime. The supreme court significantly diminished the value of the estate's
claim by confining the damages to the lifetime of the father, now deceased. Still,
the supreme court saved the estate's claim from abatement and remanded the
case for jury decision. Effectively, the supreme court preserved the claim for
wrongful death against the steamboat, but significantly limited the recoverable
damages.
Missouri's second major wrongful death case, in 1869, adjudicated the
alleged contributory negligence of a minor female, Annie Morrissey, who
drowned while on passage across the Mississippi River on defendant's vessel.'
In PatrickMorrissey v. Wiggins Feny Co., ample evidence at trial demonstrated
decedent's imprudence and want of care. This resulted in a jury verdict for
defendant because the court gave a contributory negligence instruction which
denied recovery unless the jury believed the injury occurred "without any
negligence or want of care"'" on the part of the decedent. The supreme court
remanded the case, holding that this instruction constituted error. As earlier
requested by plaintiff's counsel, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the trial
court should have instructed, "[I]f the deceased 'only remotely contributed to the
accident' and defendants' employees were the direct and immediate cause, and
might have prevented it by the exercise of prudence and care, the defendant is
liable."" 0 With resounding emphasis, the court stated that "nothing can be
clearer."'' I Significantly, the court did not adjust the standard of care to the
decedent's minority status." 2
Part II of this Article evaluated Missouri Supreme Court treatment of
steamboat industry interests, especially when matched against individual
interests. Opinions formed from sheer tabulation of supreme court affirmations
or reversals risk premature and erroneous conclusions about judicial fairness.
Close scrutiny of supreme court decisions is necessary to determine what was
done, and why, in order to paint a true picture of judicial treatment. As an
example, generalizations cushioned upon a single affirmation of a directed
verdict and judgment in favor of a steamboat (Whitmore) would be foolhardy.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Morrissey v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 43 Mo. 380, 382 (1869).
Id. at 381.
Id. at 384.
Id.
Id. at 380
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This careful investigation discloses consistently fair and even-handed treatment
implemented by strict adherence to principles of law and by judicial deference
to jury decisions, sans judicial maneuvering. Even in the gratuitous bailment of
money cases arising from suspicious circumstances in which mischievous
employees secretly, and without authority, accepted sealed packages of money
for delivery, the court imposed common carrier bailee-for-hire liability, albeit
subject to rigid requirements of proof. Even the Whitmore decision is easily
explained by judicial discipline and stare decisis, considering the Chouteau
precedent. Moreover, the court's movement from strict liability to liability for
negligence in the steamboat collision cases did change the rules as suggested by
Horwitz, but only in the neutral setting of steamboat versus steamboat or
business, and not individual against steamboat. In this and other settings, as this
Article will show, judicial dispositions did not unduly favor industry interests.
In fact, save Boland, not one decision suggests or permits an inference of bias,
economic or otherwise, by the Missouri Supreme Court in favor of industry
litigants.
I. MILLDAMS
Professor Horwitz credited canal and railroad influences for the ascension
of industrial interests from 1844 to 1873, with the big boost coming from
substitution of statutory compensation for common law nuisance-strict liability
compensation.'13 The time-honored maxim had been "that every one should so
use his rights as not to injure or molest others in the enjoyment of theirs." 14 This
maxim enjoyed acclaim, particularly in English jurisprudence.1 5 However, with
developing industries, economic pressures forced1the
judicial system to impose
6
alternative compensation for any transgressions.
Schwartz' thesis 1 7 analyzes the New Hampshire textile industry cases.1
Shocking by comparison with today's litigious society, not one injured employee
sued his or her textile employer at that time.119 Schwartz determines that the
textile industry only encountered litigation consequential to dam construction
and newly-constituted surface waters. 20 Missouri milldam operations causing
damages spawned equitable actions, especially nuisance litigation, which was
closely "policed" by the supreme court. Only Taylor v. Holman... reversed the

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 67, 71.
O'Fallon v. Dagget, 4 Mo. 343, 349 (1836).
HORWrTz, supra note 2, at 67, 71.
HoRwITz, supra note 2, at 67, 71.
Schwartz, supranote 6.
Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1719.

Schwartz, supra note 6. at 1737.
Schwartz, supra note 6. at 1737-39.

45 Mo. 371 (1870).
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milldam role as a tortfeasor. The court held a tenant liable in simple negligence
for injury to the mill.
Two adjoining landowners petitioned the Circuit Court of Saline County in
1840 for permission to build a milldam across the Lamine River." Thejury, in
Hook v. Smith,1 3 assessed that the damages would be $10 due to Hook's dam
and no damages due to Smith's dam. Accepting that jury assessment, the trial
court discharged the jury and granted Smith, the downstream petitioner,
permission to construct the dam. The supreme court affirmed with the bold
announcement, "Supposing each mill site of equal value to the public, this was
reason enough to justify the court in granting the petition of Smith... .,," This
decision firmly thrust economic considerations into judicial determinations.
Disdainful of injunctive prohibitions, the court frequently reversed
injunctive relief that halted milldam construction.' 15 In Welton v. Martin,"6 and
in Arnold v. Klepper,' the supreme court dissolved trial court injunctions for
factual deficiencies and the lack of a "complaining party" who had first
"established his right to redress by an action at law."' These decisions spurred
milldam development by limiting judicial remedies to actions at law.
Economic considerations governed legislative treatment of milldams and
received judicial approval in cases of strict adherence to statutory requirements,
as indicated in Willoughby v. Shipman."9 The trial court permitted elevation of
a milldam which predictably would cause damages to plaintiff's spring of pure
water, spring-house, out-houses, curtilages, gardens, orchards and mansionhouse. 130 Despite enabling legislation, the supreme court cautioned that "the
public necessity for the erection of a mill ought to be very apparent to justify a
court in inflicting injury on any person.'' With conviction, the court added that
a "never-failing spring of pure water is invaluable to the health and comfort of
family, and should not be destroyed by the sanction of a court unless the
paramount necessities of the public for a mill demand the sacrifice."'3
Still, the Missouri Supreme Court abided by the legislative mandate of
Section 18 of R.C.1845, directing lower courts to do likewise before authorizing
milldam construction. 33 Although inconsequential in this Article, milldam
litigation demonstrated judicial deference to legislative policy, tempered by
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Hook v. Smith, 6 Mo. 225, 227 (1840).
Id.
Id. at 228.
Arnold v. Klepper, 24 Mo. 273 (1857); Welton v. Martin, 7 Mo. 307 (1842).
7 Mo. 307 (1842).
24 Mo. 273 (1857).
Welton, 7 Mo. at 310; Arnold, 24 Mo. at 273.
28 Mo. 50 (1859).
Id. at51
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id.
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strong protection for individual property fights, yielding only to paramount
public necessity. This analysis does not show judicial favoritism toward the
milldam industry.
IV. DAMAGES
The consummate goal of adversarial parties in the judicial process is
recovery or denial of damages. Horwitz' article focuses upon judicial
subsidization of developing industry through adjustment of damages and
replacement of common law strict liability with evolving concepts of
negligence. 34 Accordingly, industry began anticipating and budgeting damage
judgments as a cost of doing business.'35 One method for subsidizing industry
was to remove damage assessment from jury determination, as Horwitz
observed:
In short, there existed a major incentive for courts not only to change the
theory of legal liability but also to reconsider the nature of legal injury. In an
underdeveloped nation with little surplus capital, elimination or reduction of
damage judgments created a new source of forced investment, as landowners
whose property values were impaired without compensation in
effect were
36
compelled to underwrite a portion of economic development.
Other methods accomplishing these objectives included: 1) rendering
damages trivial; 2) rendering damages excessive and subject to judicial control
(remittitur); 3) replacing traditional damages with inclusive and exclusive
statutory compensation; 4) designating claims noncompensable; 5) designating
damages as remote
or consequential; and 6) eliminating punitive damages,
37
among others. 1

134. HORWiTz, supra note 2, at 97, 101.
135. See generallyHORwIrTZ, supra note 2, at 67, 70 (citing evidence of this trend).
Horwitz first noted that "[a]s early as 1795 the directors of the Western and Northern

Inland Lock Navigation Companies reported that the problem of land valuations had
caused the company 'serious embarrassment', apparently because of large damage
judgments awarded by juries ....
" Id. at 67. He then stated that "[a] similar concern for
the cost of damage suits was evident in the building of the Erie Canal," and that "[t]he

cry that ruinous judgments would be visited on transportion [sic] companies became
especially strong on the eve of the great boom in railroads ... ." Id. at 69. He then
further maintained that "[b]y this time railroads also had begun to fear those damage
judgments that resulted from personal injuries or from fires started by sparks from
locomotives." Id. at 69-70. In addition, he noted that there were harmful results

"[b]ecause of large damage judgments before 1830, for example, Pennsylvania was
compelled to abandon various public works entirely before it finally took damage
assessments away fromjuries." Id. at 70.
136. HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 70.
137. See HORwITz, supra note 2, at 70-85.
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Throughout this analysis, not one instance of remittitur was encountered.'38
Within that framework, inquiry into Missouri Supreme Court treatment and
adjudication of damages is appropriate.
A. Punitive Damages
Horwitz argues vehemently that punitive damages are venal by nature and
only satisfying to our emotional comfort.'39 While contending that evidence of
malicious intent is admissible to show actual damages, Horwitz argues that
malicious intent is "irrelevant in determining the measure of damages.' 40
"There would seem to be no reason why a plaintiff should receive greater
damages from a defendant who has intentionally injured him, than from one
who has injured him accidentally, his loss being the same in both ,ases....
[l]t would be difficult to show that a plaintiff ought to receive a compensation
beyond his injury." Nor would it be any less difficult to demonstrate on
principles of law or ethics... that a defendant ought to pay more than the
plaintiff ought to receive. 4'
Returning to nineteenth century Missouri law, two personal injury suits
against railroads evinced strong sentiment against punitive damages and resulted
in two plaintiffs' jury verdicts being reversed. In Kennedy v. North Missouri
RailroadCo.,'42 plaintiff was injured when his horse drawn wagon was struck
by defendant's train at a private crossing constructed on plaintiff's farm by the
railroad company. Damages included $200 for two horses killed, $25 for
damages to the wagon and personal injuries to the plaintiff. The wrongful death
of plaintiffs daughter was held noncompensable. Although the crossing was
placed at a blind location selected by the plaintiff, plaintiff contended that an

138. But see, e.g., Hoyt v. Reed, 16 Mo. 294 (1852); Johnson v. Robertson, 1 Mo.
615 (1822); Car v. Edwards, 1 Mo. 137 (1821). The Missouri Supreme Court
consistently utilized remittitur to correct the amount ofjudgments throughout this study,
but never on a tort or related claim included in this Article. See Hoyt, 16 Mo. at 301. In
Hoyt the Court stated:
by calculation, that the verdict must include an item for which the defendant
was understood to be not liable to plaintiff, declared an intention to grant a
new trial, unless the amount of that item was remitted by the plaintiff. It was
remitted and the motion for a new trial was overruled. There was nothing
wrong in this practice. This court has allowed a remittitur to be entered here
to avoid a reversal ofjudgment below....

Id.
139. HORwiTZ, supra note 2, at 80-82.
140. HoRwiTz, supranote 2, at 80-82.
141. HORWiTZ, supranote 2, at 81-82 (quoting Theron Metcalf in 1830, later a
Judge on the Massachusetts Supreme Court).
142. 36 Mo. 351 (1865).
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overpass should have been built. A $2,000 jury verdict and judgment was
entered for plaintiff, but was reversed due to the punitive damage instruction.
The jury was instructed that exemplary damages could be awarded only if the
jury believed that the injury complained of was wilfully or recklessly done by
the defendant, and it did not so find."' The court stated with firmness:
When there is any evidence to support the verdict, it will not be disturbed; but
this court will interfere when there is no evidence, or when the court below
gives an instruction which is not authorized by the evidence.... To authorize
the giving of exemplary or vindictive, damages, either malice, violence,
oppression, or wanton recklessness, must mingle in the controversy and form
one of the chief ingredients.... In this case there is no evidence whatever of
either recklessness, wantonness, or gross negligence, on the part of those
conducting the railroad train, and consequently nothing on which to predicate
the instruction. 1"

In its reversal, the court also warned, "Courts should not state propositions of
law hypothetically when there is no evidence
in the case applicable to them.
' 45
They are calculated to mislead the jury.9'
Likewise in McKeon v. Citizens Railway Co.,1 the court reversed another
plaintiff's judgment and jury verdict due to instructional error. The decedent, a
passenger, attempted to get off the front end of defendant's moving train car.
The railroad operator's actions, whether protective or perfidious, were disputed
and controversial. 47 The jury was incorrectly instructed that defendant was
relieved of liability for persons injured while departing or catching the car at the
front end. The supreme court noted that without any evidence to support a
punitive damage recovery, punitive damages should not be submitted to the jury.
Without flinching, the supreme court reinforced recovery of punitive damages
"in a civil case, only in cases where the injury is intentionally, willfully, and
maliciously done."' 48

Corroborating evidence of egregious conduct by a ship captain justified
submission of punitive damages in Stoneseifer v. Sheble 49 After being assured
by the ship's clerk that adequate time remained for him to conduct business
before the ship departed, plaintiff boarded the steamer Sam Gaty at Louisiana,
Missouri, to arrange passage for a woman friend to St. Louis. While plaintiff
still was conducting his business aboard the Sam Gaty, the steamer hurriedly
departed, leaving the woman passenger's baggage ashore. Despite plaintiff's

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 364.
Id. at 364-65.
Id.
42 Mo. 79 (1867).
Id. at 85.
Id. at 87.
31 Mo. 243 (1860).
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continued "solicitation '"'5 to be put ashore at any landing and offer to pay $5 for
the consideration, the defendant, master of the steamer, refused and did not
release plaintiff until reaching Clarksville, Missouri. Defendant's recalcitrance
continued despite plaintiff's pleas to be placed ashore to attend to an ill family
member.
Whether this refusal was "wantonly wrong and unnecessarily offensive"''
was a jury issue. Proof was offered that the master demonstrated "a good deal
of cool indifference to the remonstrance of the plaintiff, ... not calculated to
conciliate.' ' 152 These circumstances justified a jury verdict for $300 and
judgment, which was affirmed by the supreme court with these observations:
The damages given by the jury are large, larger perhaps than the
circumstances in our judgment would warrant; but we have no power to
supersede the estimate ofthe jury and substitute ours. There is nothing in the
evidence or the result which would authorize an inference that the jury were
actuated by any improper prejudice or passion. The conduct of the defendant,
as it appeared
in evidence, was not such as to unite the sympathy of the
53
jury.'
In affirming the judgment and deferring to the jury, the court concluded:
Under these circumstances, the incivility of the captain, described by all the
witnesses who were present, was unjustifiable; and although the
inconvenience to which plaintiff was subjected was slight, and did not in our
judgment merit so large a penalty, yet we cannot say the verdict was beyond
the province of the jury, or such a one as this court would be authorized, on
the ground of excess alone, to set aside.'"
Significantly, this verdict was upheld against an individual defendant, not
the company, business owner, industry, or steamer; the warning is clear that
punitive damages are legally viable, at least against offending employees.
In summary, this Article disclosed no supreme court cases in which
individual plaintiffs suing business interests either recovered punitive damages
or were allowed to submit the punitive damage issue to ajury for determination,
yet under rigid circumstances, punitive damages remained a viable remedy
against industry.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 249.
Id.
Id. at 251.
Id. at251.
Id. at 252.
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B. Excessive Damages
Horwitz notes that nineteenth century courts set aside excessive verdicts
and perceives the trend to be that damage was becoming an issue of law.' 55 The
issue of excessive damages was urged upon the Missouri Supreme Court in two
railroad cases. In Kennedy v. North MissouriRailroad Co., discussed at length
in the previous Section, defendant contended that the $2,000 verdict was
excessive, but the supreme court responded that,
[t]he ground urged for a reversal, that the damages are too large, is not good
here. There was evidence to go [to] the jury, and where that is the case it is
their peculiar province, under proper instructions from the court, to determine
the amount Before we are at liberty to interfere with a verdict, it must appear
at first blush that the damages are flagrantly excessive, or that the jury have
been influenced by passion, prejudice or partiality. 56
In Sawyer v. Hannibal& St. Joseph Railway Co.,'57 the defendant contested
a verdict for $6,900. Plaintiff sustained soft tissue injuries to her arms and
shoulders plus a severe scalp laceration. However, the court observed, she had
not been made lame, was able to continue her career as a schoolteacher in
Kansas, walked to school daily, and did not sustain any fractures. Comparison
with other verdicts involving more serious injuries prompted the court to hold
the verdict excessive. With strong conviction, the court pronounced:
We think the damages in this case are so exorbitantly excessive, when
considered with reference to the actual injuries sustained, and the pain and
anguish suffered, for which only the law undertakes to make pecuniary
compensation by way of damages, as almost necessarily to imply some
misconduct, undue feeling or prejudice, or some misapprehension of the
proper measure and lawful object of damages in such cases. They are
excessive enough to raise a strong conviction in our minds that the jury
regarded more the terrible nature of the accident than the degree of
carelessness which they could properly have attributed to the conductor of the
train....

158

Kennedy, an affirmation, and Sawyer, a reversal, demonstrate the balance
of judicial fairness between individual and railroad industry interests.

155.
156.
157.
158.

HoR\VrTZ, supranote 2, at 84.
Kennedy v. North Mo. R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 351, 364 (1865).
37 Mo. 240 (1866).
Id. at 265.
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C. TrivialDamages
In this investigation, only twice did the court comment on the trivial,
inconsequential or insignificant amounts of damages involved in a case. First,
recalling Hook v. Smith, the case in which two competing landowners petitioned
for permission to erect a milldam, the court granted permission to the petitioner
whose dam would not cause any damages, as opposed to the proposed dam
causing $10 in damages.159 With candor, the court conceded:
The damage assessed to Smith by the jury, on Hook's petition, is so very
small, that had the court decided in Hook's favor, I should not have been
disposed to disturb its judgment. But the court having decided in favor of
Smith, by the erection of whose dam no injury is done to any body by
inundation, I am of opinion that the decision of the court ought to be
affirmed.I1 °
Similarly voicing disapproval of the trivial nature of the litigation, Calvert
v. Hannibal& St. JosephRailroadCo.161 recited, "With two direct decisions on

the question, and where the judgment was only for the trifling sum of thirty-five
dollars, the party must be absolutely in love with litigation in persisting in again
bringing the case here.' 62 With emphasis and wit, the Calvertcourt concluded
that "[t]he judgment is affirmed with ten percent damages.' 63 Despite having
some concerns, it would appear that the Missouri Supreme Court dutifully
provided judicial services regardless of lucre. Further, judicial criticism of
industry litigating "trivial damages" is scarcely preferential treatment.

159. Hook v. Smith, 6 Mo. 225, 227 (1840).
160. Id. at 229.
161. 38 Mo. 467 (1866) [hereinafter Calvert I]; but see also Calvert v. Hannibal
& St. Joseph R.R. Co., 34 Mo. 242, 244 (1863) [hereinafter Calvert I]. In the first
Calvert decision, the court's patience was again strained due to the small amount in
controversy, as evidenced in the opening language:
The petition in this case contains a clear and concise statement of the facts,
imposing a common law liability upon the appellant for the alleged
negligence of its agents. But this is not enough for the appellant, who insists
that the petition is bad because it does not likewise aver the facts necessary
to create a statutory liability, and for this cause moves in arrest ofjudgment.
It is unjust to the public that the time of the courts should be occupied in the
consideration of a question so utterly devoid of merit. There is nothing in the
objection.
Id.
162. Calvert 11, 38 Mo. at 469.

163. Id. (emphasis added).
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D. Inclusive Damages
Legislative enactments which implemented statutory compensation in lieu
of common law damages' 64 became another method of reducing the outlay of
industry capital spent on damage judgments.1 6 Missouri's legislature followed
166
that trend, but protected individual rights by maintaining existing remedies.
Statutory mandates were adopted and imposed upon the trial courts by the
Missouri Supreme Court, especially in railroad cases. 67 Inthese areas, trial
courts had little discretion.
In Baker v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Co., defendant cut and
removed timber from plaintiff's land to build its railroad on adjoining land.
16
Even though legislative enactment authorized this railroad construction,
plaintiff sued in trespass pursuant to the "Act concerning trespasses" and
prevailed. 69 The jury assessed damages of $1,088.80 against the defendant and
judgment was entered. On appeal, the supreme court reversed the judgment
against the railroad, holding that the February 23, 1853 amendment to "An Act
to incorporate the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Company," provided
specific modes of obtaining damages for wrongful appropriation of materials by
a railroad, none of which plaintiff pursued. 170 The supreme court held that the
statutory remedy in this case "is not merely cumulative upon the common law
action, but an entire substitution for it, and must be exclusively pursued; and
where either party, as in this case, may be the actor, neither can complain that the
other did not first begin."' 7' Thus, the court further opined that "[t]he common
law remedy is superseded by the statute, and the person injured must pursue the
course pointed out by the act."' 72 Judgment was reversed and the cause
remanded.

164. See, e.g., Baker v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 543 (1865);
Soulard v. City of St. Louis, 36 Mo. 546 (1865).
165. HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 71.
166. See,e.g., R.C. 1845, ch. 121, section 23 (allowing statutory damages for harm
caused by the erection of milldams, while preserving existing actions). See also PC.

1865, ch. 147, section 2 (allowing a damage award for wrongful death); R.C. 1855
(requiring the appointment of viewers to appraise land acquisitions by the railroad).
167. See,e.g., Baker,36 Mo. at 545; Soulard, 36 Mo. at 552.
168. Baker,36 Mo. at 543 (citing R.C. 1847, the original "Act to incorporate the
Hannibal and St. Joseph R.R.Company," approved February 16, 1847, which gave them
the power to take wood from adjoining lands for railroad construction).
169. Id. (citing KC.1855, p. 1552, the "Act concerning trespasses," which
contemplates the commission of wilful trespasses done without lawful right).
170. Id. at 544 (The statute specifically refers to the permissible appropriation by
the railroad of "earth, gravel, stone, wood, or other materials necessary for the
construction and operation of said road.").

171. Id. at 545.
172. Id.
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In Clark v. Hannibal& St. Joseph RailroadCo.,'73 the statutory remedy,
being exclusive, was determinative. Plaintiff sued in numerous counts alleging
that defendant trespassed upon decedent's farm to build the railroad, tore down
and did not rebuild fences and, on several occasions, struck and killed plaintiff's
75
cattle. 74 The jury returned a general verdict for $1,564 without itemization.
The supreme court reversed the jury verdict, holding that the remedy for
defendant's trespasses was included in the statutory condemnation proceeding:
Whatever damage resulted to the plaintiff from these acts, and all
disadvantages thereby occasioned to his property, must be considered as
included in the compensation awarded and paid; and any inconvenience, or
diminution of value, or other injury to the plaintiffs property beyond this,
must now be treated as damnum absque injuria.16
Alternatively, plaintiffwas permitted to pursue that count of his petition seeking
remedy for the loss of his cattle.
Consistently, the Missouri Supreme Court deferred to jury awards. As this
Part of the Article indicates, the cases are sparse in which the supreme court
rejected the jury verdict and remanded the case for retrial. Punitive damages
against industry defendants were recoverable upon strict proof of intentional and
harmful conduct, placing industry at risk. This will become much clearer in the
final Part of the Article regarding judicial perspectives.
Inclusive damages, reflecting the legislative will, were honored by the
judiciary. Where legislative damages were inclusive and/or exclusive, as in the
railroad cases, the supreme court deferred to the legislative will. Where the
legislative damages were cumulative, as in the case of milldams, the judiciary
respected statutory damages, but retained existing common law remedies.
Claimants were uniformly given 6pportunities to present their evidence and
secure an appropriate jury verdict. No judicial bias or preference for emerging
industry is discernible from these damage cases.
V. MINING AND TIMBER INTERESTS
A. Minerals
Case law examination shows that natural resources were acquired,
preserved and defended with tenacity in the nineteenth century as indicated in
the seminal and solitary case of Perry v. Block. 7 In Perry,the justice of the

173. 36 Mo. 203 (1865).
174. Id. at 212.
175. Id. at 214.
176. Id. at 222 (defendant paid $600 for right-of-way privileges pursuant to the
condemnation statute).
177. Perry v. Block, 1 Mo. 484 (1824). This study failed to uncover any further
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/8
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peace initially rendered judgment for plaintiff, who claimed that defendants were
mining and removing ore from land leased to him. Apparently defendants
Stimmer and Racine dug the ore and Block hauled it away. Only defendant
Block appealed to the circuit court. A circuit court jury verdict favored
defendants, and plaintiff appealed. The Missouri Supreme Court noted that legal
technicalities prevented the circuit court from properly hearing Block's appeal
if co-defendants Stimmer and Racine were not joined as parties on appeal.
Nevertheless the supreme court reversed and remanded the cause to the circuit
court, directing it to cure the deficiency by severing defendants Stimmer and
Racine from defendant Block so that he might proceed. The court's action
protected important ownership and possessory mineral interests against
technicalities that otherwise might allow dishonest parties to defeat justice.
B. Timber
This investigation of Missouri case law also yields seven timber conversion
cases, excluding cases with railroad litigants, since railroad litigation is discussed
in a separate Part. Four of those cases attempted recovery of treble damages and
distinguished between the action of trespass, for which only actual damages are
recoverable, and the statutory action in debt, for which treble damages are
recoverable. Plaintiff's poorly drawn petition in Montague v. Papin,178 failed to
clarify which action was being presented. The justice of the peace gave plaintiff
judgment for treble damages, which the circuit court reversed, holding that the
pleadings indicated an action for trespass, not debt. The supreme court reversed
and remanded to the circuit court, presumably affording plaintiff an opportunity
to refine his pleadings. In Papin v. Ruelle, 179 the court confirmed that treble
damages were recoverable in debt, not trespass.
In Emerson v. Beavaus,180 the court held that while the law might allow the
jury to exonerate a trespasser from treble damages because he mistakenly
believed he was cutting timber on his own land, that was not true if he
mistakenly believed he was cutting on public land. Therefore the treble damage
judgment in this case for $24, first entered by the justice of the peace, was
reinstated.
In Labeaume v. Woolfolk,'81 plaintiff sued defendant in trespass for cutting
and removing timber from plaintiff s land. The jury awarded general damages,
but failed to itemize the value of the timber. Regardless, the circuit court trebled
the damages. The Missouri Supreme Court reinstated the judgment for general

mining cases pertinent to this Article.

178.
179.
180.
181.

1 Mo. 757 (1827).
2 Mo. 28 (1828).
12 Mo. 511, 512 (1849).
18 Mo. 514, 515 (1853).
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damages, but held that without knowing the value of the timber, the circuit court
could not treble the damages.
In Frissellv. Fickes, the value of wood taken by a trespasser from the
plaintiff arose again.' Strict statutory compliance mandated that the arbitrator
who would make the assessment be sworn. Failure to do so nullified the
arbitrator's assessment of the value of the pine and oak timber removed from
plaintiff's property and caused reversal of the judgment.
James v. Snelson 83 presented competing interests by trespassers in wood
extracted from adjacent public land. James and Massey cut and corded wood for
usage in their iron works operation. Snelson, an individual, later claimed,
possessed, and. defended his interest in the wood. Judicial discussion of
ownership interests and possessory interests finally concluded that neither held
true title, but the dispute was resolved in favor of James and Massey whose labor
developed the resources. The supreme court rewarded effort, commenting:
The possession and property acquired by the (so styled) trespassers on public
land are new in the law; are peculiar to the new States, and have not been
known in the English courts.... Many of our most flourishing settlements
are mostly or in great part on public lands. Rich mines are discovered and
industriously wrought from day to day where not an inch of the soil had been
parted with by the government, nor even a chain stretched towards the
preparatory surveys which are deemed necessary to the proper disposition of
the public domain. What would be the consequence if the produce of labor
so circumstanced, the possession of mineral dug up, of crops cultivated, of
wood cut and corded, &c.were left to be scrambled for and seized upon by
the strong and cunning without the help of the law? It is manifest that a sort

of predatory war would soon be waged throughout our frontier settlements.'8
Am unusual variation to this theme developed from a sheriffs sale of cut
and corded wood in Gareschev. Boyce."'5 Garesche produced evidence of title
and a lease agreement with John Johnson and John Honiy, operators of a wood
cutting business located at the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi
Rivers. Johnson and Honiy cut and sold wood to river-boating customers and
customers in St. Louis. Judgment on debt was entered against one of the lease
owners. Execution on that judgment attached the disputed wood, which was
sold to Boyce at a sheriff's sale in St. Charles County in satisfaction of the
judgment. Garesche sued Boyce for removing the disputed wood from his land.
A jury verdict and judgment for defendant was affirmed by the supreme court.
This affirmation upheld an individual's private property right to lease his land
and an emerging wood-cutting business' right to operate the leasehold interest.

182. 27 Mo. 557, 559-60 (1858).

183. James v. Snelson, 3 Mo. 393 (1834).
184. Id. at 396.
185. Garesche v. Boyce, 8 Mo. 228 (1843).
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Thus, commercial interests were assured that judgment liens, executions and
attachments, including interests acquired at a judicial sheriff's sale, were legally
protected and enforceable.
C. Soil
Mueller v. St. Louis & Iron Mountain Railroad Co.,186 continued the
supreme court's commitment to principles of law by affirming a jury verdict for
damages against a defendant for trespass. In that case, the defendant trespassed
upon plaintiff s land during construction, and removed some of plaintiff's soil.
The plaintiffproperty owner complained about the measure of damages equaling
only the value of the soil removed. The court responded vigorously and
authoritatively, saying that "[i]f any inconvenience results to the company, from
their liability to repeated actions, it is the result of their own neglect to have the
18 7
land condemned, as they were authorized and required to do by their charter."
The court's irritation stemmed from its understanding that further trespass
actions could be filed against the defendant, which would have been obviated if
the plaintiff had condemned the land pursuant to its charter. Condemnation
litigation would have concluded the litigation in one proceeding with a final
assessment of damages. Later the court signaled approval that the plaintiff
property owner intended to finalize the dispute by delivering a deed to the
defendant trespasser at the conclusion of the proceedings.
Again, this Part demonstrates no subjugation of legal principles to industry
interests.
VI. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Any discussion about denial of litigants' claims must include mention of the
affirmative defenses which bar injured persons from recovery. The list includes
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant doctrine in
jurisprudence often referred to as the "three wicked sisters of the common
law."' 88 All three affirmative defenses thwarted claims by employees against
their employers, resulting in harsh dispositions and eventual repudiation.
Legislative movements against these three defenses culminated in Congress'
adoption of the Federal Employer's Liability Act and state legislatures' adoption
of workmen's compensation acts. 89

186. 31 Mo. 262 (1860).
187. Id. at 263.
188. Ford v. Gouin, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870, 874 (1990).
189. See HENRY WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT-THE NEGLIGENCE CASES 30
(1978). See also Westgard v. Chicago M & S.T.P. Ry. Co., 187 N.W. 658, 660 (Wis.
1922).
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The now well-settled contributory negligence rule established "that a
plaintiff who by his own misconduct in conjunction with that of the defendant
has brought harm upon himself, cannot recover damages."' 90 The affirmative
defense of assumption of the risk arises when "the risks which did not lie within
the scope of the specific obligations of the master were considered to be
accepted by the servant as an incident of his employment, and the employer was
under no duty to protect him against them.''. The fellow-servant rule, first
appearing in England in 1837, held that "the employer was not liable for injuries
caused solely by the negligence of a fellow-servant."' 92 The reasons were that
"the plaintiff upon entering the employment assumed the risk of negligence on
the part of his fellow servants, and the master did not undertake to protect him
against it. '
Horwitz contends that contributory negligence surfaced in America around
1823 and that the first contributory negligence instruction was submitted to a
jury in a collision case in 1833.94 At that time, the contributory negligence
inquiry merely presented a threshold issue, which, if answered in the negative,
resulted in the application of strict liability." Missouri steamboat collision cases
initially followed that trend, first ascertaining contributory negligence, and then
imposing strict liability. Although Horwitz declines to research judicial
treatment of affirmative defenses, this Article will examine nineteenth century
Missouri judicial treatment and disposition of affirmative defenses in tort
96
litigation.
A. ContributoryNegligence
Beginning with Steamboat Western Belle, 97 and continuing with the
Steamboat Dr. Franklin case,' 98 contributory negligence became the primary
issue in steamboat collision cases and steamboat passenger cases. 199
Contributory negligence always was an issue in railroad litigation. For example
in Kennedy v. North MissouriRailroadCo., ° the contributory negligence issue
was prominently presented for jury consideration. In Kennedy, discussed in the
previous Part regarding damages, recall that plaintiff's horse drawn wagon

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Francis H. Bohlen, ContributoryNegligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233 (1908).
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 378 (2d ed. 1955).
Id. at 380.
Id.
HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 95.
HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 96.
HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 96.
Steamboat Western Belle v. Wagner, 11 Mo. 30 (1847).
Atchison v. Steamboat Dr. Franklin, 14 Mo. 63 (1851).
See, e.g., Morrissey v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 43 Mo. 380, 380 (1869).
36 Mo. 351, 353 (1865).
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collided with defendant's train at the private farm crossing installed by
defendant. The location of the private farm crossing, described as "blind," was
selected by plaintiff, but plaintiff still maintained that the railroad was negligent
by not erecting an overpass.2"' Plaintiff entered the crossing aware that the train
was due momentarily. The evidence showed that as the horses reached the
crossing, they "stood immovable with terror ' while the train raced forward at
fifteen to twenty miles per hour. Under these circumstances, contributory
negligence was properly presented to the jury for consideration in reaching a
verdict.0 3
Three additional 1869 railroad passenger cases also presented contributory
negligence issues. In Winters v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Co.,2°4 the
plaintiff, while riding inside defendant's train car, rested his head on his arm,
which was itself resting on the window sill. Plaintiff was injured when the car
in which he was riding sideswiped another train car left perilously close to the
tracks. The jury returned a $2,500 verdict for plaintiff which was later affirmed
by the supreme court. The circuit court gave a contributory negligence
instruction because plaintiff decided to rest his head in the window sill of the
train, but the supreme court held as a matter of law that plaintiff was not
contributorily negligent.
Other 1869 railroad passenger cases were McKeon v. Citizen's Railway
Co. 11205 and Meyer v. PacificRailroadCo. II.206 In both cases, plaintiffs' jury
verdicts in the first trials were reversed on appeal due to instructional error. Both
plaintiffs prevailed again at second jury trials and the judgments were affirmed.
In both cases, the injured persons' sobriety was questionable and contributory
negligence instructions were given.
InMcKeon II, the court responded to ajury inquiry during deliberations by
giving an instruction which omitted any reference to plaintiff's contributory
negligence.20 7 Nevertheless, plaintiffs jury verdict was affirmed because, as the
court explained, the instructions must be considered in their "combination and
entirety," not as singular or isolated instructions, and the jury was properly
instructed on contributory negligence at trial. In Meyer II, the court reconciled
plaintiff's condition of intoxication within the legal concept of contributory
negligence. Importantly, however, this correlation clearly did not license the
alleged tortfeasor to maim or injure an intoxicated person with impunity.20 '

201. Id. at 352, 355.

202. Id. at 354.
203. Id. at 357-58.
204. 39 Mo. 468 (1867).
205. McKeon v. Citizen's R.R. Co., 42 Mo. 79 (1867) [hereinafter McKeon I];
McKeon v. Citizen's R.R. Co., 43 Mo. 405 (1869) [hereinafter McKeon II].
206. Meyer v. Pacific R.R.Co., 40 Mo. 151 (1867) [hereinafter Meyer I]; Meyer

v. Pacific R.R.Co., 45 Mo. 137 (1869) [hereinafter Meyer II].
207. McKeon II, 43 Mo. at 405
208. MeyerlI,45 Mo. at 156. The supreme court stated:
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Under most unusual facts, the supreme court found contributory negligence
as a matter of law in Callahan v. Warne, where the deceased, without
permission, walked through the basement area of defendants' store and drank
from a large jar containing poisonous potassium cyanate. Emphatically, the
court reversed plaintiff's jury verdict below for the wrongful death of her
husband; and observed that for the deceased to:
[s]elect the smaller jar marked with the signs of poison, lift the cover with the
emblems of death upon it, dip out or somehow get at the nauseous, stinking
liquid, and actually mistake cyanate of potassium for a wholesome drink, is
so extraordinary and unaccountable as to be almost inconceivable. 2
The court said that the conclusion would seem to be irresistible "that
[decedent's] own carelessness and imprudence were the proximate and real
cause of the accident, and that he fell a victim to his own folly."21
Nevertheless, three wrongful death suits brought by surviving widows were
successful, 1 ending in jury verdicts and judgments which were affirmed in
1867, 1869, and 1870. In each case, the issues of defendant's negligence and
decedent's contributory negligence were submitted to the jury.212 In memorable
language, the supreme court refined, or perhaps relaxed, the rigid standards of
negligence to be commensurate with the capacity of the injured party. For
example, Boland v. MissouriRailroadCo.213 involved the death of an unattended
two-year-old child who ran in front of defendant's horse car and was killed. At
the close of plaintiffs' evidence, the trial court entered a directed verdict which
was sustained by the supreme court. As a matter of law, the court found that
defendant's operator was not negligent, making the issue of contributory
negligence moot. Interestingly, this memorable language which adjusted the
standard of contributory negligence to the capacity of the minor was not
dispositive in this case. Still the dicta in this case are often cited for the
proposition that contributory negligence should be determined in accordance

[I]n our opinion, the court stated the law correctly. Unless Meyer's
intoxication directly contributed to cause the injury, and in consequence
thereof he did not exercise ordinary care and prudence, we do not see how it
should be made to operate to the detriment of the plaintiff. The very
proposition is monstrous, that because a man is drunk, although that is not the
proximate cause of the injury, he is therefore placed beyond the pale of legal
protection and may be killed with impunity.
Id. at 156.
209. Callahan v. Warne, 40 Mo. 131 (1867).
210. Id. at 140.
211. Kennayde v. Pacific R.R. Co., 45 Mo. 255 (1870); Meyer v. People's Ry. Co.,
43 Mo. 523 (1869); Liddy v. St. Louis R.R. Co., 40 Mo. 506 (1867).
212. Kennayde, 45 Mo. at 257; Meyer, 43 Mo. at 523; Liddy, 40 Mo. at 511.
213. 36 Mo. 489 (1865).
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with one's capacity. Eloquently, the Missouri Supreme Court said:
But we are not to apply the same rigid rule in determining what will be a bar
to the maintenance of an action on the grounds of contributory negligence to
an infant, an idiot, or a person non compos mentis, that we would to one who
had arrived at the age to possess ordinary judgment and discretion. All that
is necessary to give a right of action to the plaintiff for an injury inflicted by
the negligence of the defendant, is, that he should have exercised care and
prudence equal to his capacity. It would be palpably unjust to require of a
child of small capacity and little discretion the same precaution and prudence
which might reasonably be expected of a person of elder years.2" 4
In two other wrongful death cases in which decedents were minors,
plaintiffs' representatives received jury verdicts. On appeal, one judgment was
affirmed21 and the other reversed. 16 In O'Flahertyv. Union Railway Co., the
verdict was affirmed. The court cited Boland, saying:
The young and the old, the lame and infirm, are entitled to the use of the
streets, and more care must be exercised towards them by persons controlling
or managing cars and vehicles than towards those who have better powers of
motion. A child or young person cannot be expected to possess that vigilant
foresight which would be exacted of a person of maturer years. But it does
not thence follow that they are to be denied the privilege of going on the
streets, and, if they do so go, they may be killed with impunity. In the case
of a child two or three years old, no knowledge or foresight can be
expected. 2 7
Additionally, the court noted:
To say that it is negligence to permit a child to go out to play unless it is
accompanied by a grown attendant, would be to hold that free air and exercise
should only be enjoyed by the wealthy who are able to employ such
attendants and would amount to a denial of these blessings to the poor.1 8
On the other hand, in Buel v. St. Louis Transfer Co., the contributory
negligence instruction allowed recovery by the plaintiffs if the injury did not
result from "any undue carelessness" by the parents or the deceased child.21 9
Reversing the judgment for plaintiffs, the supreme court declared that the

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 489-90.
O'Flaherty v. Union Ry. Co., 45 Mo. 70, 75 (1869).
Buel v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 45 Mo. 562, 565 (1870).
O'Flaherty,45 Mo. at 73-74.
Id. at 74-75.
Buel, 45 Mo. at 564.
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"instruction on the subject of contributory negligence was unhappily phrased,
and well calculated to confuse and mislead the jury."2 0
In summary, the Missouri Supreme Court applied contributory negligence
as a bar to recovery by injured persons, generally deferring to jury decisions as
discussed in the Part dealing with judicial perspectives, infra. Most importantly,
and hardly beneficial to industry litigants, the court also adjusted contributory
negligence to the capacity of the injured person, though still complying with
legislative limitations upon recovery. Certainly, the young, the old, and the
infirm benefit by jurors judging their conduct against standards of negligence
commensurate with their "capacity."
B. Fellow-ServantDoctrine
The fellow-servant doctrine first barred recovery to an injured employee in
Missouri in 1860 in the case of McDermott v. Pacific Railroad Co. 22'
McDermott, a brakeman, sustained personal injuries when the train on which he
was stationed ran off a trestle-work and into the Gasconade River. Co-workers'
negligence left the bridge in defective condition.' Plaintiff's petition contained
"no allegation that the company employed incompetent servants or agents, or
'
that they failed to exercise ordinary care in their selection."223
The Missouri
Supreme Court held for the defendant, establishing the fellow-servant doctrine
as a bar to recovery by injured employees against their employers. In the
opinion, the court affirmed, asserting:
The principle of the common law, that a servant, who is injured by the
negligence or misconduct of his fellow servant, can maintain no action against
the master for such injury, seems to be established with great uniformity in
England and by the current of authority in the United States.... In our
judgment, public policy requires that this distinction be maintained.'
Five years later, in Schultz v. PacificRailroadCo., the widow of a railroad
day worker who was struck and killed by a locomotive car negligently operated
by co-workers, sued her husband's employer for wrongful death pursuant to
General Statute 1865, Chapter 147, Section 2, An Act for the better security of
life, property and character.m Defendant's answer succinctly set forth specific
elements of the fellow-servant doctrine. Nevertheless, plaintiff relied upon the
first clause of Section 2 of the Act which authorized recovery "[w]henever any
person shall die from any injury resulting from or occasioned by the negligence,

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 564-65.
30Mo. 115 (1860).
Id. at 117.
Id.
Id. at 116-17.
36 Mo. 13 (1865).
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unskillfulness or criminal intent of any officer, agent, servant or employee,
' z6
whilst running, conducting or managing any locomotive car or train of cars.
Another clause in the same section of the Act allowed recovery "[w]hen any
passenger shall die from any injury resulting from or occasioned by any defect
After extended
or insufficiency in any railroad or any part thereof. .,,7
analysis, the court held:
We must conclude, then, that the true purport of the statute is, that whenever
any person whatever, whether a passenger or an employee, a fellow-servant
or a mere stranger, shall die from any injury which is occasioned by the
negligence, unskillfulness or criminal intent of any officer, agent, servant or
employee, whilst running, conducting or managing the engines and train, the
employer who stands in the relation to them of master and servant, employer
and employee, at the time of the injury, shall be liable, without more, to the
representatives of the injured person in the liquidated sum of five thousand
dollars damages, and no more." '
Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's judgment and verdict in Schultz,
which was predicated upon the fellow-servant defense.229 The case was
remanded to the trial court for retrial on the issue of defendant's statutory
liability. Effectively, this applied and extended respondeatsuperiorprinciples
to the employer with respect to anyone coming within the purview of this Act,
regardless of common law rules.230 The court was careful to distinguish.
McDermott, while still recognizing the existence of the fellow-servant doctrine
defense."I Even if the trend in Schultz caused concern, the Schultz court
dutifully noted that, "[o]f the wisdom, justice or policy of the act we are not to
judge; it is enough for us that it is'' 32so enacted, and it is our simple and plain duty
to declare the law as we find it. 2
These words proved prophetic in Rohback v. PacificRailroadCo. Charles
Rohback sued his employer for two fractured legs and other personal injuries
received when he was run over by a locomotive train negligently operated by his
co-workers. 3 Again, defendant's answer asserted the fellow-servant doctrine.

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Schultz, 36 Mo. at 28.
Id. at29.
Id. at 28.
Rohback v. Pacific R.R. Co., 43 Mo. 187 (1869).
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The trial court entered judgment for the defendant based upon the McDermott
holding, and the supreme court agreed. Following McDermott and
distinguishing Schultz, the court commented upon the fellow-servant doctrine as
follows:
[I]n many cases it produces the grossest injustice, and grants an immunity of
exemption which shocks the moral feelings. But in view of the law being
settled for many years in this State, and the great weight, respectability, and,
I might add, uniformity of the authorities in the same way, I consider that we
are bound to yield an assent, or at least acquiesce in the doctrine, however
reluctant we may be to adopt it.'
As a final salve to its judicial conscience, the court in Rohback lamented that
"this''is
23 a case of great hardship, but sympathy cannot be permitted to unsettle the
5
law.

The saga of the fellow-servant doctrine continued in Harperv. St. Louis
& Indianapolis Railroad Co.236 Harper, an underage minor working as a
conductor, sustained injuries after being thrown from a train being operated by
a fireman, not an engineer. Plaintiff's action was not based upon the negligence
of the fireman, but on defendant's failure to hire a "suitable engineer." Although
the defendant railroad referenced the McDermott case, the court's opinion
omitted any reference to the fellow-servant doctrine. For other reasons,
specifically a contributory negligence instruction given but unsupported by the
evidence, defendant railroad company's judgment was reversed and remanded.23
By adroit legal skills, the plaintiff, a minor, was not denied recovery due to the
negligence of a fellow servant.
Essentially, judicial avoidance of the fellow-servant doctrine almost
eliminated its impact on an injured employee's recovery. In Gibson v. Pacific
RailroadCo.,us plaintiff, a brakeman, sued his employer for personal injuries
received when he lost three fingers uncoupling a car. Plaintiffs evidence
established that his co-employees were skillful and competent, but that the
equipment was defective. This evidence was persuasive and resulted in
plaintiff's jury verdict. 9 After reviewing the history, rationale, and precedent
applicable to the fellow-servant doctrine, the court affirmed plaintiffs
judgment.240 Again, as in Harper, adroit legal skills engineered plaintiffs

234. Id. at 193.
235. Id. at 195.

236. Harper v. St. Louis & Indianapolis R.R. Co., 44 Mo. 488 (1869).
237. Id. at 490 (plaintiffs minority status not reflected in the improperly given
contributory negligence instruction).
238. 46 Mo. 163 (1870).
239. Id. at 173.
240. Id. at 169. Recounting the reasons for the fellow-servant doctrine, the court
noted that an employee comes to work knowing that he assumes the risk of injury from
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recovery against his employer by blaming faulty equipment, thereby avoiding
the harsh impact of the fellow-servant doctrine.
In summary, economic considerations appear to be missing from the
supreme court's application of the fellow-servant doctrine. Despite two harsh
earlier results, in which the fellow-servant doctrine was applied, three injured
employees successfully maintained their actions by blaming the employer, not
co-workers. Judicial interpretations and legislative enactments facilitated
plaintiffs' recoveries. These cases demonstrated "keen concern" for victim
welfare and support Schwartz' findings that industry was treated with
' 1
",sternness."24

C. Assumption ofRisk
This survey of Missouri law uncovered just one case, Sawyer v. Hannibal
& St. Joseph RailroadCo., where defendants asserted the defense of assumption
of risk to bar a railroad passenger from recovering for personal injuries received
from a train wreck.242 It also discovered three decisions that clearly reflected the
hostile times, and the ravages of civil war and "public enemies. 243 Sawyer
best reflects those perilous times in northern Missouri during the fall of 1861.
Unlike New Hampshire, California and New England, Missouri was very much
a battleground. Sawyer, discussed in the previous Part on damages, deserves
considerable mention for other reasons, including the defense of assumption of
risk.
The incident in question in Sawyer occurred on September 3, 1861. Prior
to that time, the western division of defendant's railroad had not experienced any
hostilities. However, late on that September afternoon, "guerrillas" captured and
burned down defendant's railroad bridge spanning the Platte River near St.
Joseph, Missouri.245 After the destruction of the bridge, the "public enemies"
prevented defendant's agents and employees from warning the advancing
passenger train bearing plaintiff. The train reached the missing bridge about 11
p.m. and plummeted into the Platte River, killing five of the seven crew

negligent conduct by his co-workers, a factor over which the employer has no control.
The Missouri Supreme Court noted, however, that "it is otherwise where injuries to
servants or workmen happen by reason of improper and defective machinery and
appliances used in the prosecution of a work." Justice and reason impose liability upon

an employer who fails to provide suitable means with which to carry on his business. Id.
at 169.
241. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1717-20.
242. Sawyer v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Ry. Co., 37 Mo. 240 (1866).
243. See generally Clark v. Pacific R.R. Co., 39 Mo. 184 (1866); Sawyer v.
Hannibal & St. Joseph Ry. Co., 37 Mo. 240 (1866); Higgins v. Hannibal & St. Joseph
R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 418 (1865).
244. Sawyer, 37 Mo. at 240.
245. Id. at 245.
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members.246 Apparently word concerning hostilities along the road had been
received by the train prior to its departure, as noted by language in the opinion:
Were the passengers deceived, or did they not understand the true state of
affairs along the line of the road? That very train had been turned back not
far from Palmyra in consequence of a bridge having been tampered with the
day before so that it could not be crossed, and every passenger on it knew the
fact.
The fact is the passengers knew and understood the state of affairs
along the line ofthe roadas well as the agents and employees, and they were
willing to take their risks and stand their chances along with them without
holding the appellant bound to carry them with safety as they would do in
times of profound peace. They were certainly willing to take, and actually
took, all risks to which a state of war necessarily exposed them.247

Clearly, the supreme court recognized that the passengers were aware of risks
due to the existing state of insurrection; yet, despite those risks, the passengers,
including this plaintiff, chose to proceed on the trip. Nonetheless, the supreme
court dismissed the legal impact of the issue of assumption of risk, noting in
rather curt fashion more substantial reasons to find for the defendant:
There was much evidence... touching the operations of the public enemy,
the insurrectionary state... the military orders.... and the risks which
passengers voluntarily undertook in the face of dangers known to them, and
for which they were to be held alone responsible. This kind of evidence was
not pertinent to the issue, and it should properly have been excluded.248
Sawyer's ultimate reversal specified other bases, including instructional error
and an excessive jury verdict of $6,900. Clearly, assumption of risk was
presented, argued and considered by the supreme court, but was not accepted
as a viable defense.

VII. RAiLROAD CASES
Like the legendary "Wabash Cannonball, 2 49 the railroad industry roared
through the judicial system according to Horwitz. Further, Horwitz argues that
the judicial system tended to "change the theory of legal liability" and
"reconsider the nature of legal injury" in response.25 Schwartz, analyzing the
California tort cases and the New Hampshire textile cases, disagrees with

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 245-46.
Id. at 254.
Id.
HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 69-70.
HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 70, 79, 88, 99.
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Horwitz and concludes that the courts "sternly" held the railroads to strict
standards.25' This Article supports Schwartz' conclusions.
A. FireCases
Horwitz claims that fear of fire damage judgments obsessed the railroad
industry, resulting in reclassification of fire cases from nuisance-strict liability
cases to negligence cases.252 Schwartz disagrees, asserting that strict liability
never applied to accidentallyset fires at common law, but only to fires within the
controlof the defendant. 3 Schwartz also points out that fire cases at common
law were pled in trespass on the case, thereby accruing "negligence" attributes
akin to collision cases. 2 This, Schwartz contends, impugned the common law
assessment of fire as a strict liability action.255 This Article's investigation of
railroad fire cases in Missouri supports Schwartz' analysis and his review of
New Hampshire and California cases, 256 as Missouri courts ruled for the farmer
in such cases on almost every occasion.
Smith v. Hannibal& St. JosephRailroadCo.2 7 was decided in the absence
of any statute. The parties were strangers. Plaintiff shouldered the burden' of
258
proof, including the requirement that "the fact of negligence must be proved.
Evidence in the case indicated that a train traveled by plaintiff's field while two
young boys burned corn stalks south of the field. Thereafter a wind arose from
the south. Fire destroyed plaintiffs crops and orchard field. No one saw
defendant's engine start the fire. 9 The court declared on appeal, "[W]e cannot
say that there was any evidence before the jury which tended to show actual
negligence on the part of the defendant, and the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover, unless the proposition [of negligence] can be maintained., 260 The court
said that the outcome of the case depended upon the evidence, since an equal
presumption existed that the destructive fire started when the south wind caught
the fire tended by the two boys burning cornstalks. Consequently, the supreme
court reversed and remanded, citing instructional error and improperly excluded
exculpatory evidence on behalf of defendant. In dicta, the court also suggested
that while the farmer's failure to cut his grass did not constitute negligence, his
inaction in permitting the wind to pile up dead grass and weeds against his

251. Schwartz, supranote 6, at 1742, 1746, 1720.
252. HoRwITZ, supranote 2, at 69-70.
253. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1724.
254. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1724.
255. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1724-25.
256. Schwartz, supranote 6, at 1746.
257. 37 Mo. 287 (1866).
258. Id. at 294-95.
259. Id. at 290-91.
260. Id. at291.
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orchard near the railroad line might have constituted negligence; thus the jury
could have been asked to decide whether such negligence materially contributed
to cause the damage.26'
The Smith dicta was subsequently challenged and clarified in Fitch v.
Pacific Railroad Co. 262 In Fitch, the court affirmed plaintiff's verdict and
judgment even though defendant's negligence and plaintiffs contributory
negligence were once again contested issues. Fitch refined the Smith opinion,
establishing the presumption that "[i]t is an inference of reason that fire should
not... escape." 263 Thereafter, courts took the position that, "when a fanner
proves that the locomotive, a useful but dangerous instrument, scatters fire along
its road, without explanation, a jury is warranted in inferring that there has been
some neglect." 2 ' The presumption is rebuttable; the defendant may rebut the
inference with evidence of skill and technology, as in Fitch. In Fitch, the court
determined that the accumulation of dead and dry grass in the farm field was not
a direct cause of the destruction; engine sparks ignited and then caused the
inferno.265 The court cautioned that "the language of Judge Holmes, in Smith v.
Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Co., is very strong, and liable '2to
misconstruction unless compared with the case and the rest of the opinion." "
The court affirmed the Fitch holding in Bedford v. Hannibal& St. Joseph
RailroadCo.2 67 There the court clearly declared, "[T]he fact the fire is set by a
railroad engine isprimafacieevidence of negligence by those who run it or who
provide the engine with its contrivances,
and throws the burden of exonerating
268
them upon the railroad company."
Here again, the Missouri Supreme Court abided by precedent and existing
law before imposing liability upon railroads in fire cases. Despite the reversal
of plaintiff's judgment in Smith, the court's decision displayed balanced and
neutral adjudication of competing interests without favoritism toward railroads
and without influence by economic considerations.
B. Killing or InjuringStock
Missouri law departed conspicuously from common law, English law, and
Spanish law standards for livestock management. Missouri, as a frontier state,

261. Id. at298.
262. 45 Mo. 322 (1870).
263. Id. at 327.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 328-29.
266. Id. at 326.
267. Bedford v. Hannibal & St. Joseph 1L Co., 45 Mo. 456 (1870).
268. Id. at 458. The court even noted, "It is difficult to see what objection there
could be to these instructions." Id. at 458.
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adopted an open range legal system, allowing livestock to range at will.26 9 At
common law and in nineteenth century England, the duty of inclosure27 ° rested
upon the owner of livestock.27 ' The Spanish influence "inclosed" livestock
within the town, leaving open farm areas as "common."272 Therefore, railroads
by statute, bore the legal responsibility to "inclose" the railroad line or be liable
for injury and damages inflicted upon livestock by locomotives. 3

269. Gorman v. Pacific Railroad, 26 Mo. 441, 445 (1858). The Gorman court
noted:
It has always been the understanding as to the law in this state that our statute
concerning inclosures entirely abrogated that principle of the common law
which exempted the proprietor of land from the obligation of fencing it, and
imposed on the owner of animals the duty of confining them to his own
premises. No conviction has more thoroughly occupied the public mind than
this, and nothing would sooner arouse the attention of the community than an
apprehension that the old rule of the common law was to any extent to be
revived.
Id.
270. In English law, inclosure is the "[a]ct of freeing land from rights of common,
commonable rights, and generally all rights which obstruct cultivation and the productive
employment of labor on the soil." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (6th ed. 1990).
271. McPheeters v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 45 Mo. 22,25-26 (1869) ("It
is the law in England, and in some of the densely populated States in this Union, that the
owners of cattle shall keep them inclosed, and if they stray therefrom they are trespassers,
and the owners are guilty of negligence. But such is not, and never was, the common law
in Missouri."). See also Clark v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 202, 220
(1865) ("At common law, it was the duty of every landowner to keep his cattle within his
own enclosures, and the liability of one owner to another for damages done by the
straying cattle, turned much upon this principle; but this rule has been considerably
modified by operation of the statutes of this State.").
272. Clark,36 Mo. at 221 (1865) ("In Spanish times here in Missouri, the custom
sometimes was to inclose the cattle within the towns and commons, and to fence the
cultivated fields out; but the habit has been in modem times to inclose the fields, fencing
the cattle out, with free range upon the prairie or the highway.").
273. Id. at 220-21. The court stated:
Aside from the statute, the railroad company would not be bound to fence
their road against stray cattle, nor would they be liable for killing such cattle
upon their tracks without proof of negligence on their part; on the contrary,
the owners of cattle might be liable for damages done to the railroad, or to
trains and passengers by reason of such cattle being negligently allowed to
stray upon the railroad. The statutes so far change all this as to relieve the
owners from the obligation to keep their cattle within enclosures, and to make
the railroad corporation liable for killing cattle upon the track, without proof
of negligence on their part, unless they fence in the railroad where it runs
through enclosed fields ......
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Gorman v. PacificRailroad Co.274 is the seminal case regarding killing or
injuring livestock. Gorman allowed recovery under either statutory liability or
common law liability based upon negligence.27 As discussed earlier, Gorman
sued for damages when defendant's locomotive killed three cattle along
unfenced track running through an "inclosed field." Legislative enactments
compelled railroads to erect and maintain fences along the sides of its roadbeds
passing through inclosed fields, and to construct cattle-guards at road crossings,
or suffer liability for horses, cattle or stock injured or killed by defendants'
engines.276 Deciding against a constitutional challenge, the court held that the
railroad company, although previously chartered by the legislature, was subject
to reasonable police regulations as any private citizen would be.277 Noting
Missouri's open range law permitted livestock to wander and imposed the
obligation to "inclose" upon crop farmers, the court declared that cattle owners
had no duty to fence in livestock,278 as existed at common law.279 The statutory
obligation to fence and construct cattle-guards protected the railroad, its
passengers, cargo and crew, as well as livestock. 28" Acknowledging both the
usefulness and danger of the locomotive, the court imposed a duty of care
commensurate with the danger, saying, "The steam engine, whilst it is very
useful, is at the same time a very dangerous agent, and he who undertakes to use
it must, in order to avoid doing injuries to others, employ a skill and diligence
proportionate to its dangerous nature.' 28 Furthermore, it said that, as a common
carrier for hire, the railroad had as "its first duty.., the preservation of the
passengers and freight, yet, consistent with that duty, in order to avoid injury, it
is required to use the care and diligence
of a prudent man, knowing that he is
2 82
using a powerful and dangerous agent.
The supreme court recognized that the railroad industry, while important,
was not dominant over all creation. With that, the railroad law of Missouri was
written.283 Also, the jury verdict and judgment for Gorman were affirmed.

274. 26 Mo. 441 (1858).
275. Id. at 449. The Gorman court stated:
[A] railroad company, though not subject to an action in the nature of trespass
vi et armisfor an injury done by its servants with a steam engine unless by its
command or with its assent, is yet liable to a suit in the nature of an action on
the case for injuries done by its servants resulting from their negligence.
Id.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 449-52.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 445-46.
Gorman, 26 Mo. at 446.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 447.

282. Id.

283. See generally id. Gorman is cited as authority in numerous subsequent
opinions by the Missouri Supreme Court.
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Twenty-one of twenty-two plaintiffs prevailed at trial against railroads and
recovered damages for livestock being injured or killed by railroad locomotives.
Only once, in Lafferty v. Hannibal& St. Joseph RailroadCo.,284 did the railroad
company prevail. In Lafferty, the trial court sustained defendant's demurrer
since the injury to frightened horses did not involve any contact. The supreme
court agreed, interpreting the railroad compensation provision to require actual
contact between the livestock and the engine; so it upheld the demurrer.285
Of the twenty-one judgments won by plaintiffs at the trial level, twelve
were affirmed on appeal,28 6 nine were reversed and remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings, five were reversed and remanded for insufficiency of the
pleadings, 7 and three were reversed for insufficient proof?8 Clarkv. Hannibal
& St. Joseph RailroadCo. 211 was reversed and remanded on both instructional
error and a general verdict for damages on multiple claims.
Close analysis of the foregoing decisions discloses the court's adherence to
statutory law and precedent. When legislative enactments changed the
obligations of the railroad companies from fencing within inclosed fields and
installing cattle-guards at road crossings to fencing throughout the prairie, 290 the
supreme court adjusted its rulings to conform to the shifting legislative mandate.
Nowhere do we find judicial preference for the railroad industry. In fact, in the
Calvertopinion,29' the Missouri Supreme Court assisted plaintiff by suggesting
that counsel amend plaintiff's petition. The second opinion confirmed that the
petition was amended and affirmed plaintiffs judgment. In that case, Hannibal
& St. Joseph Railroad Company sued Patrick S. Kenney, an individual.292
284. 44 Mo. 291 (1869).
285. Id. at 294.
286. Iba v. Hannibal & St. Joseph RIR. Co., 45 Mo. 469 (1870); McPheeters v.
Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 45 Mo. 22 (1869); Tarwater v. Hannibal & St. Joseph
R1R. Co., 42 Mo. 193 (1868); Vickers v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 42 Mo. 198
(1868); Calvert II, 38 Mo. 467 (1866); Powell v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 35
Mo. 457.(1865); Trice v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 35 Mo. 418 (1865); Trice v.
Hannibal & St. Joseph R.1L Co., 35 Mo. 416 (1865); Trice v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R.
Co., 35 Mo. 188 (1864); Garner v. Hannibal & St. Joseph IR. Co., 34 Mo. 235 (1863);
Burton v. North Mo. RL1R, 30 Mo. 372 (1860); Gorman v. Pacific R.R. Co., 26 Mo. 441
(1858).
287. Hansberger v. Pacific R.R. Co., 43 Mo. 196 (1869); Dyer v. Pacific R.R. Co.,
34 Mo. 127 (1863); West v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 34 Mo. 177 (1863); Miles
v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 34 Mo. 407 (1861); Quick v. Hannibal & St. Joseph
RL Co., 31 Mo. 399 (1861).
288. Meyer v. North Mo. R.R. Co., 35 Mo. 352 (1864); Brown v. Hannibal & St.
Joseph R.R. Co., 33 Mo. 309 (1863); Calvert I, 34 Mo. 242 (1863).
289. Clark v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 203 (1865).
290. Id. at 219, 221.
291. See Calvert II, 38 Mo. 467 (1866) (allowing plaintiff to amend its petition
affirming plaintiff's judgment).
292. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co. v. Kenney, 41 Mo. 271 (1867).
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Plaintiff requested $20,000 in damages because Kenney permitted his mules to
stray upon plaintiff's railroad tracks causing damage to the locomotive train and
road. The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer. The supreme court
affirmed, preserving the open range law.293
The Calvert and Kenney cases, along with other remands and reversals,
suggest the supreme court's "keen concern" for "victims," at the expense of the
railroad industry. Certainly, no economic benefits accrued to the railroad
industry from these decisions.
C. Eminent Domain, LandAcquisitions, and Conversions
According to Horwitz, legislative enactments limited damages for canal
company land acquisitions by eliminating juries, appointing appraisers, and
including all damages in a single award.294 Schwartz limited his investigation to
other tort cases.295 Still, natural resources were coveted in the nineteenth
century, as indicated in Part VII on mining and timber interests. Legislative
authority empowered railroads to use whatever resources were available to
construct and maintain the railroad line, and Horwitz espoused this as support
for his theory. This Section reviews and analyzes the Missouri cases.
In Lindell v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Co., plaintiff sued the
defendant railroad for trespass, seeking the statutory remedy of treble
damages.296 Plaintiff pursued the action despite the fact that by statutory
incorporation, Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company had been given
legislative authority to take and utilize available resources in constructing the
railroad line.297 Plaintiff sought treble damages. Defendant contacted a justice
of the peace who appointed "three disinterested freeholders; they assessed
plaintiff's damages at $1,100." The railroad's legislative charter authorized
appropriation of available resources to construct rail lines. In this case, the court
assessed actual damages,
not treble damages, reserving this statutory penalty for
' 298
"willful trespasses.
Although the legal procedure was available, Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad
Company did not initiate the adopted condemnation process, but still
appropriated the necessary resources.299
Under these unauthorized
circumstances, an action in trespass succeeded. The court relentlessly protected
individual property owners against unauthorized railroad trespasses. The
293. Id.
294. HORWITZ, supranote 2, at 76-84. Horwitz referred to this treatment as the
"inclusivity" of damages into the award.
295. Schwartz, supranote 6, at 1719.
296. Lindell v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 25 Mo. 550 (1857).
297. See R.C. 1853 (act to amend an act, entitled: "An act to Incorporate the
Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company").
298. Lindell, 25 Mo. at 551-52.
299. Mueller v. St. Louis & Iron Mountain R.R. Co., 31 Mo. 262 (1860).
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supreme court, addressing a similar railroad trespass, 3° reversed the trial court's
dismissal on the basis of improper venue, holding that trespass actions are
personal and may be brought in any county.
The Missouri Supreme Court consistently abided by statutory directives
as indicated by cases during the 1855 to 1865 railroad construction boom.
Examples include, first, holding that an assessment of damages by "three
discreet, disinterested men, citizens of the county," was final; second, upholding
the legislative denial of jurisdiction to justices of the peace for assessment of
damages caused by railroad construction;3 1 third, upholding a railroad's
authority to appropriate natural materials from nearby land for use in railroad
construction; and fourth, holding that the enabling railroad statute provided the
exclusive remedy to assess damages.
In Clarkv. Hannibal& St. Joseph RailroadCo., 30 2 the court emphatically
denied any additional recovery for damages accruing to the land after receipt of
the statutory compensation. Plaintiff had granted Hannibal & St. Joseph
Railroad Company a right-of-way, for which he received compensation. During
construction and usage of the right-of-way, defendant inflicted serious damage
to plaintiff's fences, land, terrain, and natural drainage, which resulted in stock
coming through the gaps in fencing and trampling crops. Plaintiff sued for
damages but died while the case was pending. The court determined that, in the
absence of negligent construction, all the property damages "[m]ust be
considered as the natural and necessary consequence of what the corporation had
acquired the lawful right to do; and such damages must be taken to have been
included in the compensation assessed. . .. "'
Without hesitation, the supreme court followed established legal principles
in deciding land disputes involving Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company
as plaintiff. Pursuant to a federal grant, the railroad purchased Missouri land
occupied by defendant Jeremiah P. Moore. The railroad company sued in
ejectment, but the trial court refused to receive the railroad's evidence of title.
'34
The trial court's judgment was reversed and remanded as "clearly erroneous. 0
Again, deference to the statutory law and precedent guided the court's
decisions. Without any suggestion of partiality to industry or consideration of
economic influences, the Missouri Supreme Court maintained its judicial
commitment to established legal principles and ecumenical fair treatment.

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R Co. v. Mahoney, 42 Mo. 467 (1868).
Fatchell v. St. Louis & Iron Mountain R.R. Co., 28 Mo. 178 (1859).
36 Mo. 202 (1865).
Id. at 222-24.
Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co. v. Moore, 37 Mo. 341, 342 (1866).
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D. Collisionsand Mishaps Involving Strangers,Other Vehicles,
Employees, Pedestriansand Passengers
1. Strangers
Judicial treatment of railroad liability resulting from collisions and mishaps
can be analyzed by examining the personal injury and death claims generated by
the locomotive, affectionately referred to as "useful," but respectfully referred
to as a "dangerous agent., 305 Recognizing both "useful" and "dangerous"
aspects, the supreme court established the legal duty toward strangers in
Gorman,holding as follows:
Although the duty of the company as a carrier extends only to the passengers
and freight on the trains, and the law of carriers is only applicable to it as the
transporter of passengers and freight, yet as regards the persons and things to
which it does not stand in that relation it is under that law which enjoins on
it the duty of so using the things over which it has control as not to do harm
to others, and which exacts of it a caution and prudence commensurate to the
dangerous nature of the means which it employs. Whilst its first duty is the
preservation of the passengers and freight, yet, consistent with that duty, in
order to avoid injury, it is required to use the care and diligence 3of6 a prudent
man, knowing that he is using a powerful and dangerous agent. 1

2. Collisions with Other Vehicles
Plaintiffs prevailed at the trial court in both reported cases involving a
locomotive colliding with another vehicle. Plaintiffs, driving horse drawn
wagons, presented evidence in both cases that the defendant railroad train failed
to signal its approach to the crossings. The Kennedy collision occurred at a
private crossing on plaintiffs farm; Kennedy was reversed. 30 7 The Tabor
collision occurred at a blind public crossing. The supreme court affirmed

Tabor.

8

305. Gorman v. Pacific R.. Co., 26 Mo. 441,447 (1858).
306. Id.
307. Kennedy v. North Mo. R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 351, 365 (1865). The supreme court
reversed because the trial court submitted a punitive damage instruction to the jury
without any evidentiary support. Emphatically, the court held that giving the punitive
damage instruction was designed to mislead the jury. Id.
308. See Tabor v. Missouri Valley R.R. Co., 46 Mo. 353, 354 (1870). See also
Kenned, 36 Mo. at 355, 356. Both cases recite the railroad's obligation to blow a
whistle or ring a bell when approaching a public crossing. The public crossing in
Kennedy was approximately one mile from the private crossing. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/8
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Driving his horse-drawn wagon, Tabor entered the blind public crossing.
Not seeing or hearing an approaching train, plaintiff should have been able to
assume
[t]hat there is no car sufficiently near to make the crossing dangerous; that he
had a right to presume that in handling their cars the railroad companies will
act with appropriate care and the usual signals of approach will be seasonably
given, and the managers of the train will be attentive and vigilant.0 9
In Kennedy, the court placed a high duty of care upon the railroad company,
but carefull; conditioned recovery upon plaintiff's freedom from contributory
negligence:
[R]ailroad companies, owing to the dangerous character of the machinery and
vehicles they operate, will be held to the greatest caution and skill in the
management of their business: but this will not exonerate others who are
wanting in prudence, or guilty of negligence.310
Neither case suggests any partiality or consideration of economic protection
for the railroad by the supreme court, rather each case displays respect for
statutory direction and established precedent.
3. Employees
In the discussion of the fellow-servant doctrine above, this Article presented
a detailed discussion of the master-servant cases. All those cases involved
railroads and, therefore, are relevant here. To the cases discussed suprawe must
add Higgins v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Co."' Plaintiff brought a
wrongful death action for the death of her father, a brakeman for defendant.
Civil war in Missouri forced defendant to discontinue operating the train on
which decedent served. Rains and swollen streams washed out the track,
resulting in a train accident in which decedent was thrown from the train and
killed." Decedent's status as passenger or employee and the propriety of
warning notices were vigorously disputed.3 13 Decedent suffered fatal injuries on
September 16, 1861, approximately two weeks after his train stopped running
due to guerrilla activity.

309. Tabor,46 Mo. at 356.
310. Kennedy, 36 Mo. at 351.
311. Higgins v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 35 Mo. 418 (1865).
312. Higgins, 35 Mo. at 418.
313. Id. at 418, 419. Disclaimer notices were allegedly posted in the passenger
cars warning passengers that riding in the baggage car was prohibited. Id.
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As in Schultz,314 plaintiffs recovery rested upon &.C. 1855, the contention
being maintained that decedent was a passenger and not an employee. Plaintiff
did not seek benefits under the Schultz holding, which allowed recovery to "any
person," but instead directly claimed benefits as a passenger under the second
clause of the Act.3 5 Decedent's status stirred much controversy given his
employment record, his actions, and the company's rules and regulations.
Ultimately, however, the court held that the Act applied only to passengers,
stating that "the evidence tended to prove that he was an employee, and not a
passenger, within the purview of the act., 316 The court went on to say that even
if decedent was a passenger, he could not recover, because riding in the baggage
car could be considered negligence contributing to his own injury.3 7 Therefore,
the court held that plaintiffs jury verdict must be reversed and the cause
remanded with directions to allow the jury to consider evidence on these issues.
Analysis of Higgins fortifies the earlier conclusion based upon the fellowservant cases: the Missouri Supreme Court resolved issues on legal principles,
not economic influences or favoritism toward industry. The rules remained
intact and judicial determinations framed the issues for retrial upon remand to the
trial court.
4. Pedestrians
Six reported cases involved pedestrians killed or injured by railroad
companies.31 Three involved children. 319 Excepting Boland,32 the plaintiffs
prevailed, winning all judgments at the trial level. Only in Bue 32' was plaintiff's
judgment reversed. Even then, the court reversed, not on the facts of the case,
but because the trial court injected the words "undue carelessness" in the
contributory negligence instruction. 3z
Significantly, in child-pedestrian cases, the court relaxed contributory
negligence standards according to the injured person's capacity, thereby
adjusting the standard of care required of a child, an idiot or a person non
compos mentis away from the "ordinary careful person" standard.323

314. Id.
315. See R.C. 1855 (clause 2).
316. Higgins,35 Mo. at 433.
317. Id. at 436.
318. Kennayde v. Pacific LR. Co., 45 Mo. 255 (1870); Buel v. St. Louis Transfer
Co., 45 Mo. 562 (1870); Meyer v. People's Ry. Co., 43 Mo. 523 (1869); O'Flaherty v.
Union Ry. Co., 45 Mo. 70 (1869); Liddy v. St. Louis R.R. Co., 40 Mo. 506 (1867);
Boland v. Missouri R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 484,484 (1865).
319. Buel, 45 Mo. at 562; O'Flaherty,45 Mo. at 70; Boland, 36 Mo. at 484.
320. Boland, 36 Mo. at 484.
321. Buel, 45 Mo. at 565.
322. Id. at 564, 565.
323. Boland, 36 Mo. at 489, 490.
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Nevertheless, defendant's judgment in Boland was extreme. The trial court
granted a directed verdict for defendant at the end of the evidence, which was
affirmed on appeal.324 The directed verdict made the court's discussion on
contributory negligence mere dicta.325
Dicta or not, O'Flaherty followed the Boland rule on contributory
negligence for minors,3 2' affirming the jury verdict for the death of a young girl
under three years of age.327 Both Buel and Boland scrupulously assessed the
care, attention, and diligence with which defendants' cars were being operated.
Although reversed, Buel was remanded for retrial and jury decision with
directions for proper instructions.
et cases involving adult
InKennayde, Liddy and Meyer,321 wrongful death
pedestrians sans evidence of alcohol involvement, the supreme court approved
plaintiffs' jury verdicts. The supreme court examined the instructions on
negligence and contributory negligence issues and left the decisions to the juries.
In Meyer, the supreme court concluded that the instructions were correct
statements of law: "[T]here is no error in the action of the court, and the
judgment must be affirmed., 329 Despite reservations about the Meyer jury
verdict, the supreme court accepted the decision, hardly an indication of
favoritism or economic protectionism.
In Kennayde, defendant's train, operating without lights, signals or flagmen
warning of its presence, ran down and killed Michael Kennayde. The supreme
court affirmed, saying, "[T]he whole case was well submitted to the jury. They
found Kennayde
blameless, and the company negligent. Let the judgment be
330
affirmed."
Again, in Liddy, Michael Liddy was crossing the street when he was run
down and killed by defendant's railway car. The night was cloudy, dark and
foggy, but defendant's horses had bells on. The supreme court confirmed that
the jury had been properly instructed, and then stated:
[I]t was a question of fact for the jury, whether the rate of speed of the car at
the time of the occurrence was within the limit fixed by the city ordinances
or not.... The duty of defendant's servants and agents to keep a vigilant
lookout for vehicles and persons on foot, taking into consideration all the

attending circumstances, was also a proper question for the consideration of
the jury. Taking the instructions all together, and considering them as a

324. Id. at492.
325. Id. ("Now, by reference to the evidence, we think it clear there was no
negligence shown by defendants or their agents.").
326. O'Flaherty v. Union Ry. Co., 45 Mo. 70, 73 (1869).
327. Id. at 75.
328. Kennayde v. Pacific R.R. Co., 45 Mo. 255 (1870).
329. Meyer v. People's Ry. Co., 43 Mo. 523, 527 (1869).
330. Kennayde, 45 Mo. at 262.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

51

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 8

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 63

whole, we think they were sufficiently warranted by the evidence, and
presented the law of the case fairly to the jury.33'

Analysis of these pedestrian cases reveals no bias or partiality of the
judiciary. Certainly, leaving decisions to the jury seems fair and consistent with
the jury function, not partial or protective of the emerging railroad industry.
5. Passengers
The Missouri Supreme Court decided eight railroad-passenger cases from
1863 to 1869. Plaintiffs won jury verdicts in all eight cases at the trial level,
three of which were retrials. 332 Railroad company appeals were successful in
three instances, with railroads obtaining reversals due to instructional error.333
Upon remand, all three plaintiffs again successfully prosecuted their claims,
receiving jury verdicts and judgments which were upheld by the supreme court.
In Sawyer334 and Winters,335 contributory negligence was not an issue. In
fact, in Winters, the supreme court adamantly insisted that the trial court
correctly refused defendant's contributory negligence instruction because the
passenger could not have been negligent.336 In the court's words, "[T]he
evidence did not warrant the giving of such instructions; there was nothing in it
which could properly be said to show any negligence that produced ' or
338
'' 3
contributed to produce the accident and injury. " The court's "enthusiasm
for Nathan A. Winters, was lacking for Amanda Sawyer, who lost her jury
verdict for $6,900 because it was excessive. At length, the Sawyer court
discussed the activities of the "public enemy" who precipitated the casualty,
declining that defense.339

331. Liddy v. St. Louis R.R. Co., 40 Mo. 506 (1867).
332. McKeon II, 43 Mo. 405 (1869); McKeon I, 42 Mo. 79 (1867); Meyer 11, 45
Mo. 137 (1869); Meyer I, 40 Mo. 151 (1867); Winters v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R.
Co., 39 Mo. 468 (1867); Huelsenkamp v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 37 Mo. 538 (1866)
[hereinafter Huelsenkanp II]; Huelsenkanp v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 34 Mo. 45 (1863)
[hereinafter Huelsenkamp I]; Sawyer v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 37 Mo. 240
(1866).
333. MeKeon 1, 42 Mo. at 86, 88; Meyer 1, 40 Mo. at 154; Huelsenkamp1, 34 Mo.
at 54.

334. Sawyer, 37 Mo. at 240.
335. Winters, 39 Mo. at 468.

336. Id. at 475.
337. Id.
338. See Winters, 39 Mo. at 475, 476 (concluding that the number of plaintiff's
children was competent evidence because it showed plaintiffs situation in life and
"enabled" the jury to better assess his damages).

339. See Sawyer, 37 Mo. at 240 (which is not the only claim for injuries or damages
against the railroad industry due to hostile forces causing casualties). See also Clark v.
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McKeon, Meyer and Huelsenkampjoinedissues of the railroads' negligence
and the passengers' contributory negligence for jury decision. The supreme
court accepted the verdicts, but expressed disapproval of the Meyer verdict. 340
Strong evidence of the passenger's intoxication complicated recovery in both
the McKeon and Meyer cases.34' Both plaintiffs received jury verdicts in their
first trials, only to suffer reversals on appeal. But both plaintiffs prevailed again
in second jury trials, and this time the supreme court affirmed both judgments
and verdicts as questions for jury decision sans judicial intrusion.
In Huelsenkamp, plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of her husband who
was crushed between two railway cars.342 The decedent, a passenger on a
crowded railway car, was standing on the step, holding on with his hands, with
his body leaning out at'the moment of impact. As in Meyer and McKeon,
plaintiff lost her first jury verdict and judgment on appeal, but again prevailed
with the 34second
jury verdict. The supreme court affirmed the second
3
judgment.
A thorough examination of these cases discloses that the supreme court
closely scrutinized the evidence, adhered to principles of law, and insisted that
given instructions correctly reflect the law and evidence presented at trial. In
McKeon, the court found there was no evidence justifying a punitive damage
instruction; in Meyer, the court found that the entire question of negligence was
improperly withdrawn from jury decision because the instruction directed a
verdict for plaintiff. In Huelsenkamp I, the court found instructional error
because the jury was precluded from considering plaintiffs contributory
negligence, despite evidence that plaintiff voluntarily selected and occupied an
evidently dangerous position on the train. By allowing jury determination of
both plaintiffs' and defendants' negligence, the court preserved judicial fairness.
These cases scarcely support any notion of judicial protection of the railroad
industry. In fact, Winters suggests judicial protection of the individual.

Pacific R.R. Co., 39 Mo. 184 (1867). The train conductor placed train cars containing
plaintiff's goods on a side track. Overnight, hostile forces burned the train. The supreme
court denied recovery holding that the conductor was unaware of the hostile forces, and,
further the delay in the Jefferson City rail yards was a "remote" cause of loss and not a
proximate cause. Id. See also Higgins v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 418
(1865).
340. Meyer II, 45 Mo. 137 (1869).
341. McKeon 1,42 Mo. 79, 85 (1867); Meyer I, 40 Mo. 151 (1867).
342. Huelsenkamp I, 34 Mo. 45 (1863).
343. Id.
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VIII. JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES
Professor Horwitz suggests in his study that judicial intrusions into jury
functions 3" and legislative decisions345 subsidized emerging industries from
1795 through 1860.24 This Part studies the influences of the jury, industry, and
economic considerations injudicial resolutions, as well as the institutional role
of the judiciary in government.
A. JudicialFunction of the Jury as FactFinder
This research consistently indicates that the Missouri Supreme Court
adamantly respected the jury's decision-making role in litigation. In Chouteau
v. Steamboat St. Anthony,347 the court reversed the trial court's directed verdict
which favored the steamboat St. Anthony, holding, "[W]e think the instructions
of the court should have left it to the jury to decide, from the evidence before
them, whether boats were or were not in the habit of carrying such packages as
'
freight or for hire."348
Brown v. Hannibal& St. Joseph RailroadCo." held that unless they waive
their rights, citizens are "entitled to a jury of twelve men as a matter of
constitutional right." Likewise, in Meyer v. Pacific RailroadCo. I, the supreme
court continued to recognize the jury's vital role in the justice system,
eloquently reminding the citizenry, "The constitution and laws of the country
have imposed upon juries peculiar duties, and, unless they grossly abuse their
trust, this tribunal is not to invade their province and revise their work."35 The
court said that the reason for this jury deference was plain: The jury's
"opportunities for judging of the capacity, integrity and credibility of witnesses
by seeing them face to face, and observing the manner of giving their testimony,
make them possess advantages which we are deprived of."35' Insisting that its
respect for jury verdicts was well established, the court asserted:
The doctrine is so well established it is hardly necessary to repeat it, that this
court will not disturb a verdict because it is against the weight of evidence.
Where there is a complete and total failure of evidence, and it has no tendency

344. HORWITZ, supranote 2, at 81.
345. HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 99, 101.

346.

HORWITZ,

supranote 2, at 95.

347. 12 Mo. 389, 393 (1849).

348. Id.
349. Brown v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 37 Mo. 298 (1866).
350. Meyer I, 40 Mo. 151, 154 (Mo. 1867). This was the trial from the first case
brought by the widow over the death of her husband who fell from the train. His sobriety
was questionable, but plaintiff still was favored with the jury verdict in the circuit court.
Reversed and remanded on appeal, plaintiff also prevailed in the second trial.

351. Id.
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to prove the issue, the court will be warranted in determining the whole case
as a question of law; but where there is any evidence conducing to support the

issue, or prove the allegations made by the pleadings, it is for the jury to say
what weight shall be attached to it.3 52
Two juries ultimately decided in favor of Meyer's widow despite Meyer's
intoxicated condition. The supreme court squarely addressed the appropriateness
of this disposition in its second opinion and also cast the supreme court's
consequential role in deferring to such decisions. Upon retrial, another jury
considered and decided both the negligence of defendant's employees and
decedent's contributory negligence. The court commented that the "evidence
was conflicting, but it is not for this court to say that the jury erred."3 3
The supreme court was so strongly pledged to honoring jury decisions that
judicial respect extended even to cases in which evidence was presented only by
one party, but totally disregarded by the jury.354 Steamboat City ofMemphis v.
Matthews 5. resolutely held:
All the testimony was on one side, but the jury disregarded it, and the circuit
court, who heard the witnesses, sanctioned the verdict of the jury. We must
infer from this that the circuit court was satisfied with the course of the jury.

The credit due to witnesses is a matter peculiarly for a jury, and any control
over the finding of ajury in this respect could hardly be judiciously exercised

by this court, which possesses no means of forming a correct opinion,
56 and
must be guided altogether by what appears on the face of the record.
Further expressing its belief in the process, the court concluded with the
observation that "the circuit judge would not of course permit a verdict to stand
against his own instructions, and as that court
has virtually certified to us that the
357
verdict was right, we can not interfere."
Supreme court respect for legal precedent, legislative enactments and jury
decisions fostered support for the trial court. Keating v. Bradford5 summed up
the court's position on granting new trials, holding:
It can scarcely be necessary to repeat that this court, by a long course of

precedents, has refused to interfere with the verdicts ofjuries on the ground
that they are against the weight of evidence, after the judge who heard the

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Id.
Meyer 11, 45 Mo. 137, 137-38 (1869).
Steamboat City of Memphis v. Matthews, 28 Mo. 248, 248-49 (1859).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 249.

358. Keating v. Bradford, 25 Mo. 86 (1857).
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evidence has sanctioned the verdict by a refusal to grant a new trial. Jurors
try the facts and the judges determine the law.359
The jury's duty to decide fact issues, particularly negligence, was
convincingly imprinted upon Missouri jurisprudence, as demonstrated by
opinions in steamboat and railroad cases involving citizens, patrons, passengers,
pedestrians, destruction by fire and the killing of livestock.36 For instance, in
Huelsenkamp v. Citizens RailroadCo. I and Huelsenkamp v. Citizens Railroad
Co. 11,361 the court opined that "[n]egligence and unskillfulness are matters of
fact, and their existence is a question for the jury." A court cannot direct a jury
that "such or such supposed facts show negligence, or that such other supposed
facts do not show negligence. 3 62 Further, the court held that "the question of
negligence was for the jury, and was properly submitted to them under
instructions which fairly and correctly presented the true issue in the case and the
law arising thereon."363
In Kennayde v. PacificRailroadCo.,3 the plaintiff, a widow whose sober
pedestrian husband was run over by defendant's train, received a judgment. The
judgment was affirmed by the court with the comment, "Whether the facts
constituted such negligence as to render the company responsible, was a matter
exclusively for the jury to determine, and if the court did not mislead them by
'
giving erroneous instructions, the judgment must be affirmed."365
The supreme court resolved to submit negligence issues for jury decision.
This commitment is manifest in unmistakable language in Meyer I, McPheeters
v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Co., 366 and Boland v. Missouri Railroad
Co. 367 Meyer and Boland already have been analyzed and discussed at length.
In McPheeters,Joseph H. McPheeters' "milch" cow was killed by defendant's
locomotive at a public crossing in Palmyra, Missouri. The supreme court
affirmed plaintiff s jury verdict and judgment, proclaiming: "[T]he question of
negligence is peculiarly and exclusively for the jury to determine, and it is hardly

359. Id. at 87.
360. See, e.g., Fitch v. Pacific KLR Co., 45 Mo. 322,325 (1870); Taborv. Missouri
Valley 1KR. Co., 46 Mo. 353, 353 (1870); Liddy v. St. Louis tR. Co., 40 Mo. 506, 51920 (1867); Huelsenkamp I, 34 Mo. 45, 54 (1865).
361. Huelsenkamp I, 34 Mo. at 45; Huelsenkamp II, 37 Mo. 537, 554 (1866)
(wrongful death suit brought by wife of passenger who was killed while standing on the
train car's platform).
362. Huelsehkamp1, 34 Mo. at 54.
363. Huelsenkamp 11, 37 Mo. at 554.
364. Kennayde v. Pacific R.L Co., 45 Mo. 255, 257 (1870).
365. Id. at258.
366. McPheeters v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R Co., 45 Mo. 22, 24 (1870).
367. Boland v. Missouri R.K_ Co., 36 Mo. 484,491 (1865) ("What is reasonable
skill, proper care, caution, prudence or diligence, or what constitutes negligence, is
strictly a matter of fact, and can only be determined by a jury.").
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necessary to again repeat what has been so often held by this368
court, that if there
is any evidence to sustain the verdict we will not interfere.
Both fire cases and contributory negligence cases contained supreme court
direction that negligence issues necessitate jury submission and verdict.369 Even
when dissatisfied with the jury verdict,370 the supreme court remained steadfast
in its support of jury verdicts, as indicated in its affirmance of Bartlett v.
37'
Steamboat Philadelphia.
Supreme court deference to the fact finder extended to trial judges as
well.3 2 Observing that the evidence was presented without any exception being
taken at trial, the court commented, "This case, therefore, presents to this court
nothing, except the finding of the court below on the evidence, and we are called
'
on to review that finding."373
Without hesitation or explanation, the Leith court
held with conviction that "[ilt has long been the practice of this court to refuse
to interfere in such cases, and we see no reason now to depart from it.... the
'
judgment below is affirmed."374
In summary, although the nineteenth century Missouri Supreme Court
enforced proper instruction on the law, the court clearly left fact resolution for
jury determination. Hardly any economic advantage can be claimed or argued
from this fact.
B. Supreme Court Criticisms ofIndustry Legal Positions
Although Missouri Supreme Court opinions were generally noncommital
regarding the conduct or legal positions of parties or counsel, exceptional
circumstances reveal situations in which judicial patience wore thin." The
impact of the court's criticisms must be assessed in light of the disposition the
court imposed in each case. For instance, as discussed earlier, in the context of
Calvert I, the court stated, "It is unjust to the public that the time of the courts
should be occupied in the consideration of a question so utterly devoid of merit.

368. McPheeters,45 Mo. at 24.
369. Kennayde v. Pacific R.R. Co., 45 Mo. 255, 258 (1870); Meyer 11,45 Mo. 137,
137-38 (1869); Meyer I, 40 Mo. 151, 154 (1867); Liddy v. St. Louis R.R. Co., 40 Mo.
506, 519-20 (1867); McKeon I, 42 Mo. 79, 84 (1867).
370. Bartlett v. Steamboat Philadelphia, 32 Mo. 256, 259 (1862) (Judge Bates
lamented that "whilst I am not satisfied with the verdict, there is no such error apparent
in the record as will authorize a reversal of the judgment.").
371. Id.
372. Leith v. Steamboat Pride of the West, 16 Mo. 181, 181 (1852).

373. Id.
374. Id.
375. See, e.g., Calvert II,
38 Mo. 467, 468 (1866); Calvert I, 34 Mo. 242, 244

(1863); Gorman v. Pacific R.R. Co., 26 Mo. 441,448 (1858); Chouteau v. Steamboat St.
Anthony, 20 Mo. 519, 521 (1855).
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There is nothing in the objection. The judgment, however, must be reversed. 376
Such criticism was surely of little concern since the court overturned plaintiff's
verdict and remanded the case in accordance with the railroad company's appeal.
3 77
In Calvert II,
the court's criticism carried an economic impact on the
defendant railroad because plaintiff s jury verdict was upheld and the railroad
company's appeal was denied. Relentless appeals in Chouteau triggered
stinging criticism, but the steamboat St. Anthony weathered the criticism by
prevailing on appeal.
Judicial criticism is less acceptable when combined with an unsuccessful
appeal, as in Gorman v. PacificRailroadCo. Gorman affirmed plaintiff's jury
verdict and judgment, denied defendant's appeal, and suggested that the railroad
company was "selfish":
Although railroad corporations are organized for the public benefit, [these] are
matters in which the state takes a deep interest and regards as of public
concern; although they may be looked upon as bodies endowed with
capacities for the promotion of the public good and for the diffusion of
advantages to the state, yet it must not be overlooked that such corporations
are entirely managed by private individuals over whose selection the state has
no control, and that their pecuniary profits belong exclusively to 378
the
companies and their stockholders. Here there is a motive to selfishness.
In Mueller v. St. Louis & Iron Mountain RailroadCo., 379 discussed earlier,
the railroad failed to initiate condemnation proceedings as authorized by its
charter, incurring the wrath of the court. After taking and damaging plaintiff
Mueller's land, the railroad faced repeated common law trespass actions,
creating the specter of a multiplicity of lawsuits for trespass. Although the law
abhors multiple actions,38 the supreme court displayed little judicial compassion,
affirming plaintiff s judgment and trespass verdict and voicing disapproval of
defendant's inaction: "If any inconvenience results to the company, from their
liability to repeated actions, it is the result of their own neglect to have the land
condemned, as they were authorized and required to do by their charter."3 8'
In Morrissey v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 38 2 the supreme court's disapproval was
more gentle. Still the court voiced unhappiness with the erroneous instructions
offered by defendant and given by the trial court. Noting that plaintiff s tendered

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Calvert1,34 Mo. at 244.
Calvert11, 38 Mo. at 469.
Gorman, 26 Mo. at 448.
Mueller v. St. Louis & Iron Mountain R.R. Co., 31 Mo. 262, 263 (1860).
Id.
Id.
Morrissey v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 43 Mo. 380, 384 (1869).
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instructions correctly stated the applicable law, the court added curtly,
"[N]othing can be clearer."3 3
The court's most critical commentary impugning railroad industry motives
appeared in Kennayde v. PacificRailroadCo.3 The court said:
In the case at bar, the defendant not only misled the deceased, by omitting all
the usual and customary precautions to notify persons of the pending danger,
but it acted in open and flagrant violation of the statute made for the
protection of the public. The consequence of the omission was to put the
victim off his guard, to disarm his vigilance, and lull him into a false sense
of security. When the laws are broken and defied, and homicides are
recklessly committed, it is no part of the business of courts to hunt up excuses
or seize upon technicalities for the purpose of shielding the wrongdoers.385
This criticism led to adverse results when the supreme court affirmed plaintiff's
judgment and denied the railroad's appeal. The supreme court did not reproach
claimants for similar conduct.
Any contention that the supreme court shielded the railroad industry from
criticism must fail after Kennayde and Gorman. Chouteau38 6 and Morrissey
evoke judicial displeasure with steamboat litigants, but not in the same strident
tone as Gorman and Kennayde. Nonetheless, none of these opinions shields the
steamboat or railroad industry from judicial rebuke.
C. Economic Pronouncements
Infrequently, the court references economic considerations in its opinions.
As already discussed, O'Fallon v. Dagget?8 7 balanced private property rights
against the needs of the navigation industry without demonstrating any partiality
389
388
or favoritism. Similarly, in both Hook v. Smith and Willoughby v. Shipman,
the court considered public interests in granting permission to construct a
milldam, again without favoritism or partiality.

383. Id.
384. Kennayde v. Pacific RL1L Co., 45 Mo. 255 (1870). As previously discussed,
plaintiff, a widow, sued defendant for the death of her husband, a pedestrian who was run
over and killed by defendant. Evidence showed that defendant's employees failed to
sound warnings of the approach of the locomotive as required by statute. Decedent's
sobriety was emphasized. Id.
385. Id. at 262.
386. See Chouteau v. Steamboat St. Anthony, 20 Mo. 519, 521 (1855).
387. O'Fallon v. Dagget, 4 Mo. 209, 212 (1836).
388. Hook v. Smith, 6 Mo. 225, 228 (1840).
389. Willoughby v. Shipman, 28 Mo. 50, 52 (1859).
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Western Union's liability for negligent transmission of an order for salt was
litigated in Wann v. Western Union Telegraph Co.39 The company transposed
"sail" for "rail" as the mode of delivery in transmitting the telegraphic message.
The court overturned plaintiff's jury verdict for $1,085.44 and imposed only
limited liability on the company pursuant to principles of statutory interpretation
of the "Act concerning telegraph companies." 39'
The supreme court's most significant opinion weighing public
responsibility against economic benefits from an emerging industry was
pronounced in Gorman v. PacificRailroadCo.3" The supreme court eloquently
addressed the conflicting interests:
The other interests in the state are not all to be made subservient to the
railroad interest. That interest enters into competition with other pursuits with
the advantages and privileges the law confers upon it, but there is nothing in
it of so overshadowing a character that all other pursuits must yield to it.
There are none who are not impressed with the importance of railroads, and
their great utility as the medium of intercourse and commerce. No state that
will keep pace with the age but must build and encourage them. But we
should be cautious how we clothe them with privileges and immunities, at the
cost of the rest of the community, which may enkindle a spirit hostile to their
existence and seeking its gratification in their destruction.393
Strong as they are, none of these pronouncements indicates any judicial
favoritism for emerging industry or contemporary economic interests at the
sacrifice or subjugation of private interests.
D. JudicialFunction and PolicyDecisions
Horwitz suggests that the nineteenth century judicial role expanded into
jury and legislative roles by determining damages and imposing taxes,
respectively.394 Missouri's Supreme Court promulgated judicial deference to the
legislature as its perceived role in the American body politic.395 By abrogating
the fellow-servant doctrine through judicial interpretation of "an Act for the

390. Wann v. Western Union Tel. Co., 37 Mo. 472 (1866); but see Reed v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 37 S.W. 904 (Mo. 1896).
391. Wann, 37 Mo. at 483 (citing R.C. 1855, ch. 156, sections 5-6, p. 1521). The
court stated that "this description of liability comes within the intention of the regulations
provided for in the statute." Id.
392. Gorman v. Pacific R.R. Co., 26 Mo. 441 (1858).
393. Id. at 446-47. Plaintiff, a farmer, sued over the destruction of three cattle by
defendant's railroad locomotive. The opinion restates and affirms Missouri's open range
policy for livestock which is contrary to common law. Id.
394. HORWITz, supranote 2, at 99, 101.
395. Schultz v. Pacific R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 9, 15 (1865).
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better security of life, property and character," 396 the supreme court manifested
3
its intent to abide by the legislative will, not traditional common law doctrines.
It eloquently designated its judicial role with this statement: "[O]f the wisdom,
justice or policy of the act we are not to judge; it is enough for us that it is so
39
enacted, and it is our simple and plain duty to declare the law as we find it.
In Smith v. Hannibal& St. Joseph RailroadCo., the debate over the merits
of this Missouri statute, versus legislation in other jurisdictions, met with concise
rejection by the court: "[U]ntil the Legislature sees fit to change the law on the
subject, we must be guided by the established principles governing the case. '
The court's policy of deference to the legislature continued in Kennayde v.
PacificRailroadCo. with the pronouncement: "[W]hen the laws are broken and
defied, and homicides are recklessly committed, it is no part of the business of
courts to hunt up excuses or seize upon technicalities for the purpose of shielding
the wrong-doers. 4 °0
The court held firm to this principle in O'Flahertyv. Union Railway Co.,
resisting the impulse to upset a jury verdict for the death of a two-year, eightmonth-old child.40 ' The court stated emphatically: "That verdict can only be
disturbed by attempting to withdraw this case from the operation of the
established law of this State, and we do not feel particularly called upon to
invent new rules for the purpose of screening and protecting wrong-doers."4 2
The O'Flahertycourt reasoned as it had earlier in Morrissey v. Wiggins Ferry
Co., emphasizing adherence to established law. In Morissey, the court said,
The instructions asserted correct propositions of law, and should have been
given. They tell the jury that if the deceased only remotely contributed to the
accident, and if the agents and employees of the defendant were the direct and
immediate cause, and might have prevented it by the exercise ofprudence and
care, the defendant is liable. Nothing can be clearer. 3
The Missouri Supreme Court exercised judicial restraint and deference to
both legislative will and established precedent in reaching its decisions.
Economic influences and developing industries were not favored and were
subjected to the same rules as ordinary citizens.

396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

Id. at 15 (citing R.C. 1855, section 2, p. 647).
Id.
Id. at 18.
Smith v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 37 Mo. 287 (1866).
Id. at 262.
O'Flaherty v. Union Ry. Co., 45 Mo. 70, 75 (1869).
Id. at 75.
Morrissey,43 Mo. at 384.
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IX. CONCLUSION

In O'Fallonv. Daggett, the first case cited, the Missouri Supreme Court
announced its direction with the maxim, "[E]very one should so use his rights
as not to injure or molest others in the enjoyment of theirs." Fifty years later, in
Bedford v. Hannibal& St. Joseph RailroadCo., the last case cited, the Missouri
Supreme Court repeated the maxim, "[E]very one should so use his rights as not
to injure or molest others in the enjoyment of theirs."
Such consistency truly reflects the character of the Missouri Supreme Court
which, this Article concludes, adjudicated fairly, respected legal precedent, and
practiced judicial restraint. Individual interests often clashed with emerging
industry interests, but received fair treatment from both the Missouri judiciary
and juries. This exhaustive study of cases adjudicating industry interests rebuts
any label designating Missouri courtrooms "chambers of commerce." The indepth analysis of Missouri cases from statehood to 1870 reveals judicial respect
and deference to stare decisis, the jury institution, and the legislative branch of
government.
This Article demonstrates that the supreme court relentlessly yielded
judicial control by remanding cases to the trial court for jury trial and final
disposition. Close examination of even those decisions clearly favoring industry
litigants reveals that the supreme court established dispute resolution guidelines
incorporating juries" and legislative enactments," 5 and enforcing wellestablished procedural rules 4 and private contracts.0 7 Four cases40 8 concluded
404. Hannibal & St. Joseph RR Co. v. Kenney, 41 Mo. 271,274 (1867). The trial
court sustained defendant's demurrer to the petition, but was reversed because "there may
arise a state of circumstances showing that [defendant] was guilty of such wilfulness or
negligence in regard to his animals as would prevent a recovery of damages for their
destruction; and for the same reason we think he might be liable to the company for the
damage done by him."
405. Baker v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 544, 545 (1865). Plaintiff's
default judgment was reversed because the court construed the "Act concerning
trespasses" inapplicable, thereby eliminating the jurisdictional basis (subject matter) for
the suit; Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co. v. Mahoney, 42 Mo. 467, 471 (1868).
Defendant's judgment was reversed because the court construed the authorizing statute
-inapplicable to trespass actions.
406. Hansberger v. Pacific R.R. Co., 43 Mo. 196, 200 (1869); Miles v. Hannibal
& St. Joseph RR Co., 31 Mo. 407,408-09 (1861);Quick v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R.
Co., 31 Mo. 399, 400 (1861); Syme v. Steamboat Indiana, 28 Mo. 535 (1859). In these
cases, the supreme court reversed and remanded plaintiffs' judgments, finding profound
deficiencies in plaintiffs' pleadings.
407. Sturgess v. Steamboat Columbus, 23 Mo. 230 (1864). The written terms of
the parties' private contract were enforced by the court.
408. Lafferty v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 44 Mo. 291 (1869); Boland v.
Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 484 (1865); McDermott v. Pacific R.R. Co., 30 Mo.
115, 117 (1860); Whitmore v. Steamboat Caroline, 20 Mo. 513, 518 (1855).
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in the supreme court were not remanded and stand out as exceptions to this
thesis. None of these four cases benefitted from trial on the merits or jury
decision. In BolandYe and Whitmore,410 directed verdicts by the trial courts were
affirmed, thus concluding the litigation in favor of defendants Missouri Pacific
Railroad Company and steamboat Caroline.
In Lafferty4 and McDermott, 12 pronouncements of law terminated the
litigation in favor of defendants Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company and
Pacific Railroad Company. Although remanded, Callahan413 convincingly
imposed a judicial solution in favor of individual defendants Warne, Cheever
and Burchard, finding that each defendant was not negligent4 14 and that decedent
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.41 5
The Whitmore decision can be reconciled by acknowledging the precedent
of Chouteau. 416 Lafferty can be reconciled by attributing the decision to
legislative intent requiring "physical contact.""1 7 McDermott can be explained
by judicial precedent and adherence to the fellow-servant doctrine. 418 - Boland,
however, resists explanation and remains the singular419 example of Missouri

409. Boland, 36 Mo. at 489. At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, the trial court
instructed the jury "that on the evidence in this cause, the plaintiffs cannot recover."
Plaintiffs thereupon took a nonsuit and the matter reached the supreme court on a writ
of error.
410. Whitmore, 20 Mo. at 515. The trial court instructed the jury at the close of
plaintiffs' evidence that "they could not recover in this action." Plaintiffs submitted to
a nonsuit and the case was appealed to the supreme court on a writ of error.
411. Id.at 292, 293. The circuit court sustained defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's
petition. Judge Wagner held:
[I]t
seems to me plain that a direct or actual collision was contemplated; that
where the agents of the road ran the locomotives or cars against any animal,
and thereby injured it, or in any other manner it was hurt by actual contact or
touch, then the company should be responsible for the penalty; otherwise not.

Id.
412. McDermott, 30 Mo. at 117. Plaintiff received judgment by default on her
petition and damages were assessed, followed by this appeal. Further, the court held that
the facts of the case fell within the fellow-servant doctrine which should be maintained
for policy reasons.
413. Callahan v. Warne, 40 Mo. 131 (1867). At the close of plaintiffs evidence,
defendants, merchants operating a house-furnishing store, demurred. The trial court
refused to direct a verdict for defendants and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs.
Defendants appealed. Id. at 133-34.
414. Id. at 139.
415. Id. at 140.
416. Whitmore, 20 Mo. at 517.
417. Lafferty, 40 Mo. at 294.
418. McDermott, 30 Mo. at 116-17.
419. Callahanwas remanded to the trial court for final disposition, and the final
result is unknown.
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judicial favoritism for industry. After McDermott, and excepting Callahan,this
Article concludes that such harsh affirmative defenses as the fellow-servant
doctrine and contributory negligence were cushioned by jury verdicts,
legislation, and judicial interpretation. Further analysis discloses that judicial
pronouncements supporting emerging industry were infrequent and staunchly
protective of individual rights.
Theories about nineteenth century state court deference to industry interests
and subjugation of individual rights collapse in Missouri under the weight of this
study. That long-tenured and universally honored maxim, "You can't judge a
book by its cover," substantiates the theme of this Article. This Article is the
result of a thorough reading of the book of torts on nineteenth century Missouri
jurisprudence. This inclusive and careful examination of fifty years of Missouri
cases supports Schwartz' exhaustive study in California and New Hampshire,
which concludes that "the nineteenth century negligence system was applied
with impressive sternness to major industries and that tort law exhibited a keen
concern for victim welfare." Even acknowledging Boland, this Article's
findings disprove the existence of nineteenth century judicial maneuvering by
Missouri courts to protect the capital wealth of emerging industry.
The evidence is received, deliberations are concluded, the verdict is
unanimous, and appeal is without merit: Missouri's nineteenth century supreme
court constituted a chamber ofjustice.
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